Editorial

As *DiGeSt* goes to press, the stakes in the debate on gender and diversity are once again high. The beginning of 2017 saw a powerful statement of women across the world with the Women's March on 21 January, only days after the inauguration of President Trump in the United States. Men and women marched together to advocate women's rights, LGBTQ rights, workers' rights, racial equality, and freedom of religion. That the fight for equal rights continues to be necessary was also demonstrated when a Polish member of the European parliament, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, told his fellow members that he thought women should earn less than men, because they are supposedly "weaker", "smaller", and "less intelligent".[1] Korwin-Mikke was called out on his statement by a Spanish member of the European parliament, Iratxe García-Perez, and sanctioned by the European parliament. Protest continued on International Women's Day when women went on strike to protest against a neoliberal system and to fight for a more inclusive, gender equal world. Within this context of advocacy for women's rights and human rights, *DiGeSt* continues its commitment to publishing new work on gender and diversity across the humanities, social sciences, and psy-disciplines. It wants to provide a forum for debate on gender and diversity, predominantly in Europe.

This issue opens with a quantitative study by **Myrte Dierckx, Petra Meier, and Joz Motmans**. In "'Beyond the Box': A Comprehensive Study of Sexist, Homophobic, and Transphobic Attitudes Among the Belgian Population", Dierckx, Meier, and Motmans present and interpret the results of a large-scale survey conducted in Belgium in 2013 on sexist, homophobic, lesbophobic, biphobic, and transphobic attitudes. Their research splits up attitudes in cognitive beliefs, affect, and behaviour, and looks for correlations between sexist, homophobic, lesbophobic, biphobic, and transphobic attitudes on the one hand and background variables such as sex, age, education, religion, and gender identification on the other hand. According to their study, socially dominant and rigid gender attitudes are the strongest predictors of sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes, and this for men and women, younger and older generations. Despite anti-discrimination laws and equality policies, so Dierckx, Meier, and Motmans assert, "individuals who do not conform to the heteronormative standard . . . often remain the objects of stigmatisation and prejudice". The authors argue for a more nuanced understanding of gender as going beyond the metaphorical male/female "box" as crucial for ensuring more positive attitudes towards LGBTQ people. They recommend creating more diverse social environments and giving adequate information on sexual identity as beneficial for altering heteronormative and rigid gender beliefs.

The distribution of adequate information regarding sexual identity is precisely what is at stake in **Justine De Kerf**'s contribution "Anti-Gay Propaganda Laws:

1 Rankin, J. (14 March 2017). Polish MEP punished for saying women are less intelligent than men. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/polish-mep-janusz-korwin-mikke-punished-saying-women-less-intelligent-men

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Time for the European Court of Human Rights to Overcome Her Fear of Commitment". De Kerf elucidates Russia's prohibition of propaganda of non-traditional (read: LGBTQ) sexual relationships. In Russia, she notes, the law states that "children should not be misguided into believing that non-traditional relationships are equivalent to traditional (heterosexual) relationships". De Kerf discusses Russia's anti-gay propaganda laws in the context of human rights. She examines the role of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights in enforcing the European Convention of Human Rights, signed by Russia. If the European Court is truly committed to defending the rights of LGBTQ people, she argues, then it should make a clear statement with regard to Russia's anti-propaganda laws that are found to be at odds with the European Convention. De Kerf, however, also points to the complex political situation, since a strong judgement by the Court condemning these laws could be perceived as a sign of Russophobia, therefore alienating the Russian people from the human rights debate. Nevertheless, she urges the Court to take a strong stance.

If the first two contributions are concerned with LGBTQ rights, the next two articles engage with theoretical perspectives and intersectional analysis. **Seunghyun Song** revisits Frantz Fanon's seminal *Black Skin, White Masks* in "Bridging Epidermalization of Black Inferiority and the Racial Epidermal Schema: Internalizing Oppression to the Level of Possibilities". She reads Fanon's text in relation to phenomenology, elucidating how modes of perception in colonial contexts become ingrained in the body, thus leading to the internalization of racial oppression. Song asserts that Fanon's insights are still relevant to our understanding of racial oppression today. Phenomenology, she maintains, helps us to attain "deeper and more impactful understandings of oppressive processes and their consequences", highlighting "how oppression functions at the level of bodily consciousness". However, Fanon's study also needs to be expanded, as he does not take into account an intersectional perspective. For Song, the racism and sexism as experienced by women of colour lead to "fundamentally different forms of self-realization and decolonization": women of colour, she notes, do not don a white mask but a white, male mask. In other words, we need to question how the internalization of oppression works across multiple categories of identity.

In "Diasporic Muslims, Mental Health, and Subjectivity: Perspectives and Experiences of Mental Health Care Professionals in Ghent", **Elise Rondelez, Sarah Bracke, Griet Roets, Caroline Vandekinderen, and Piet Bracke** rely on Nikolas Rose's theory of subjectivity and Edward Said's views of cultural difference to examine how mental health care professionals in Ghent approach and construct diasporic Muslims as subjects and mental health care recipients. They focus on diasporic Muslims in Ghent, because this group is "largely underrepresented in or even absent from mental health care institutions in Belgium". As an ethnic-religious minority in Ghent, diasporic Muslims are often subject to racism and social exclusion, leading to a higher risk of mental health problems. Through an analysis of twenty-four interviews with mental health care professionals, Rondelez et al. are able to identify

a number of assumptions professional health care providers make with regard to diasporic Muslims. Their research shows that mental health care professionals often adopt a neoliberal logic in which good citizenship equals being a healthy, autonomous individual. Mental health care providers, moreover, are shown to set up a system of "us" versus "them", by treating diasporic Muslims as different and inferior, for instance, with regard to knowledge about the body and mind. The authors further warn against the dangers of "hyper-culturalisation", in which a so-called "culturally sensitive approach" constructs diasporic Muslims as almost entirely determined by their culture. Such a discourse, they argue, ignores personal and contextual differences, reducing diasporic Muslims to one homogeneous group. The article concludes that further research is necessary to investigate how a more dialogic relation can be constructed between (Western) mental health care professionals and diasporic Muslims.

The "What are you reading?" section presents a number of short notes on recent and canonical critical studies that are of particular significance to a researcher's ongoing project. **Sophie Withaeckx** discusses Daisy Hernandez and Bushra Rehman's *Colonize this! Young Women of Color on Today's Feminism*; **Ntokozo Yingwana** examines Chi Mgbako's *To Live Freely in this World: Sex Worker Activism in Africa*; **Rozemarijn Vervoort** explores Sara Ahmed's *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*; Nira Yuval-Davis's *Gender & Nation* is taken up by **Laura Andriessen**; **Emma-Lee Amponsah** returns to Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*; and **Sean Bex** engages with the discourse of human rights in his discussion of Samuel Moyn's lecture "How Human Rights Changed Utopianism" and *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. These researchers not only comment on a critical work but also relate it to their own research and gauge its significance for current developments in the field of gender and diversity studies.

Finally, we are pleased to announce that *DiGeSt* has been included in the Flemish Academic Bibliography for the Social Sciences and Humanities (VABB-SHW) and that it has found a new home with University Press Leuven. We look forward to the new collaboration and hope that our readers and subscribers will continue to support us. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance of our interns Laura Andriessen and Lisen Maebe with the daily business of the journal and in proofreading texts. As always, thanks are due to the members of the editorial board and the advisory board, as well as the anonymous peer reviewers for making *DiGeSt* possible. We hope the journal may continue to flourish and grow. The next issue will be a special issue on "Unruly Bodies", guest edited by Sarah Bracke, Anaïs Van Ertvelde, and Lith Lefranc.

Birgit Van Puymbroeck, editor-in-chief

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"Beyond the Box": A Comprehensive Study of Sexist, Homophobic, and Transphobic Attitudes Among the Belgian Population

Myrte Dierckx, Petra Meier, and Joz Motmans

Abstract

While various studies have examined sexist, homophobic, lesbophobic, biphobic, and transphobic attitudes, no comprehensive research has yet combined all of these attitudes in all of their dimensions (cognitive beliefs, affect, and behaviour). Furthermore, most previous studies have failed to take the influences of respondents' sexual orientation and gender identity into consideration in their analyses. The "Beyond the Box" survey, conducted in Belgium in 2013, employed a holistic research design that included various attitude scales and background variables, such as sexual orientation, gender identity, gender role, and sex assigned at birth. In order to attract enough participants from gender and sexual minority groups, an online convenience sampling method was used. In total, 5,624 respondents living in Belgium participated in the study. The findings allow us, firstly, to distinguish intersections between social dominance, genderism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia; and background variables which surpass traditional social, economic, and demographic variables. Secondly, the results show that, despite the anti-discrimination laws and equality policies that have been implemented in Belgium in recent decades, sexist, homophobic, and transphobic prejudices remain widespread and are rooted in rigid gender belief systems. The study also indicates that, in order to create more positive attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities, we must start by addressing heteronormative and rigidly dualistic gender beliefs.

Keywords

sexism, homophobia, transphobia, gender identity, sexual orientation, survey

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Introduction

In Belgium, all citizens are legally protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation, birth sex (including gender reassignment), gender identity, and gender expression. Nevertheless, daily social reality demonstrates that intolerant attitudes and rigid conservative beliefs regarding sex and gender still persist when it comes to assumed sexual or gender identities (D'haese, Van Houtte, & Dewaele, 2013; Motmans, 2010).

Empirical data on homophobic and sexist attitudes in Belgium is limited, and nonexistent when it comes to transphobia. Moreover, international research regarding sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes is not systematic. The European Social Survey and the European Values Study are exceptions to this rule, but contain only one and two items on these topics respectively. No existing research has investigated sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes together or considered their various dimensions (cognitive beliefs, affect, and behaviour) and background variables.

A survey entitled "Beyond the Box" was conducted in Belgium in 2013 with the aim of measuring sexist, homophobic, lesbophobic, biphobic, and transphobic attitudes among the general Belgian population in order to address the shortcomings mentioned above and extend the findings of previous research. In combining all of these attitudes in a comprehensive research design, we intended to determine, firstly, whether some form of common ground could be detected which would explain certain attitudes, and secondly, whether and how the respondents' own demographic and social background variables, gender identity, and sexual orientation played a role in explaining their affective, behavioural, and cognitive attitudes. This in order to answer the central research question: what and how do homosexual and heterosexual cis- and transgender men and women think, feel, and behave with regard to sexism, homophobia, and transphobia? The following subquestions were also included: can differences in attitude be explained by birth sex, gender identity, gender role, age, educational level, sexual orientation, minority status, and/or contact with members of minority groups? How are the various attitude scales correlated with one other? And how are the different dimensions—cognitive, affective, and behavioural—related to one other?

Social Context of the Survey

Formal equality between men and women in Belgium has its roots in the middle of the twentieth century, with women's suffrage in 1948 an important stepping-stone. Suffrage was followed by more equality in the educational system and the labour market, with the result that the social position of women improved significantly. Discrimination based on birth sex (including gender reassignment) has been illegal—and thus punishable—in Belgium since 2007 ("De wet van 10 mei 2007 ter bestrijding van discriminatie tussen vrouwen en mannen", 2007).

Besides suffrage, the middle of the twentieth century also saw the first attempts at organising and emancipating Belgium's homosexual community (Hellinck, n.d.; Van Haegendoren, Lenaers, Steegmans, & Van Aerschot, 2004). Half a century later, in the 1990s, homosexual relationships were gaining increasing legal recognition. Civil marriage between two people of the same registered sex has been legal in Belgium since 2003; same-sex couples have been allowed to adopt children since 2006. In the years that followed these decisions, "sexual orientation" was also added to existing antidiscrimination legislation as a protected ground (Borghs, 2003; De Cock, 2010).

In recent years, the discourse on equal rights and opportunities in Belgium has begun to focus on transpeople. In 2007, the law on transsexuality was approved, granting transpeople the right to change their first names and registered birth sex, provided strict medical criteria had been met. In 2014, the discrimination grounds were extended to include gender identity and gender expression.

Yet the formal equality ensured by the strong legal framework is not yet reflected in the everyday realities of both women and men, or of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) people. Discrimination based on sex and sexist prejudices towards both women and men are still widespread in Belgium (Instituut voor de gelijkheid van vrouwen en mannen, 2013). Recent studies confirm this lack of equality and demonstrate the high prevalence of discrimination and even violence toward LGBT populations in Belgium (D'haese et al., 2013; Hooghe, Claes, Harell, Quintelier, & Dejaeghere, 2010; Motmans, 2010; Pickery & Noppe, 2007). Besides these studies of the LGBT populations' experiences, however, very little empirical data are available on sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes among the Belgian population.

Studying Attitudes

While women are not a numerical minority group, they have historically held a socially, politically, and economically inferior position; this has led to sexist prejudices becoming historically embedded (Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2000). Unlike women, LGBT people are numerical minorities. They face stigmatisation in heteronormative societies in which binary gender roles remain the standard: a person is typically assumed to be either a man or a woman, and to be heterosexual. Those who do not adhere to this rigid framework often become the object of sexual stigmatisation (Walch, Ngamake, Francisco, Stitt, & Shingler, 2012). Herek (2007) describes sexual stigma as "the negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to any non-heterosexual behaviour, identity, relationship, or community". As a result, one of the key factors in studying sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes is the rejection of non-conformist gender behaviour. Research shows that men and women who violate traditional gender roles are often still punished socially (Glick & Fiske, 2001). It is interesting

to note that, while homosexual behaviour has gained acceptance in recent years, gender-transgressive behaviour remains taboo: it is not sexual orientation or transidentity that causes aversion, but openly non-conformist gender behaviour (Gordon & Meyer, 2007; Horn, 2007). Thus, transpeople who behave according to the binary gender norms encounter less resistance than do transpeople whose identity is gender incongruent (Carrera-Fernández, Lameiras-Fernández, & Rodríguez-Castro, 2013). It can, therefore, be concluded that sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes have certain elements in common and are all rooted in aversion to non-conformist gender behaviour. In what follows, we outline the key aspects identified by research into sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes.

Sexist attitudes

Research by Glick and Fiske (1996) proved that sexist attitudes are not necessarily negative. Glick and Fiske therefore make the distinction between "benevolent" and "hostile" sexism. Benevolent sexism is characterised by positive images of women, but these images nevertheless endorse traditional gender roles and male dominance (e.g. "Women should be cherished and protected by men"). While this type of prejudice appears to be positive, it still positions women as inferior and incompetent compared to men. Hostile sexism, on the other hand, is characterised by outspokenly negative prejudice towards women (e.g. "When women lose in a fair competition against men, they typically complain about discrimination"). Because sexist attitudes are socially embedded, women themselves may harbour sexist attitudes towards women (Blanton, Christie, & Dye, 2002). Men can also be the object of sexist attitudes. The approving image of men's higher social status (e.g. "Men are more willing to protect others") is an example of a benevolent sexist attitude towards men, but hostile stereotypes of men also exist (e.g. "Men will do anything to get a woman into bed"). However, since men and women have historically held different social positions, sexist prejudices have different consequences for the two groups (Michielsens & Angioletti, 2009). Sexism towards men and women is often correlated. Respondents who score high on both scales, for example, generally have more traditional views of men and women (Glick & Fiske, 1999). In addition to sexism based on traditional gender roles and stereotypes, there is also an emerging body of literature on "modern" sexism, a more subtle, hidden form of sexism that is evidenced by prevailing gender inequality in formally egalitarian societies (Ekehammar et al., 2000; Swim & Cohen, 1997).

Homophobic and transphobic attitudes

As with sexist attitudes, research has revealed various dimensions of homophobic and transphobic attitudes, including cognitive, affective, and behavioural aspects (Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999). In the paragraphs below, we explore the key findings from the literature on homophobia, bi- and lesbophobia, and transphobia.

In the literature on homophobia, cognitive attitudes are described as opinions and convictions about homosexual people, whereas affective attitudes are less rational and based more on the emotions that arise when an individual encounters someone he/she believes is homosexual. The behavioural aspect involves homophobic behaviour or behavioural reactions towards people who are perceived to be homosexual, including physical and verbal violence (Wright et al., 1999). Extensive research into homophobic attitudes, especially towards gay men, has indicated that homophobic attitudes have deteriorated in Western European societies (Kuyper, Iedema, & Keuzenkamp, 2013). Various authors point out that homophobia in Western society has moved away from traditional, moral objections towards homosexuality to a more modern, negative attitude towards homosexual people. Discrepancies have arisen between declared attitudes ("I am not homophobic"), actual behaviour (negative reactions towards sexual minorities) and automatic stereotyping (Crocker, 2005; Sandfort, 2005). Hence, the term "modern homonegativity" has come to reflect modern Western attitudes towards sexual minorities more accurately (Morrison & Morrison, 2003; van Wijk, van de Meerendonk, Bakker, & Vanwesenbeeck, 2005). The term refers not to traditional objections to homosexuality but to more unconscious behaviour and stereotyping (Satcher & Schumacker, 2009). On modern homonegativity scales, homosexual respondents attain similar scores to heterosexual respondents, which can be explained by internalised homophobia. As with women and sexism, homosexual people also internalise negative attitudes towards and assumptions about homosexual people (Cox, Dewaele, van Houtte, & Vincke, 2010; Szymanski & Chung, 2001).

Prejudice against bisexual people and lesbians has received less academic attention than prejudice against gay men (Fernee & Keuzenkamp, 2011; Herek, 2002; van Lisdonk & Kooiman, 2012). The little research that has been conducted on attitudes towards bisexual people reveals that both heterosexual and homosexual men and women have ambivalent attitudes towards bisexual men and women. Accordingly, bisexual people can be said to experience a sort of double discrimination, from both the heterosexual and homosexual communities (McLean, 2008; Mulick & Wright, 2008; Weiss, 2008).

Unlike the literature on sexism and homophobia, the literature on transphobia is still in its early stages. Research shows that transphobic attitudes correlate with sexist and homophobic attitudes (Carrera-Fernández et al., 2013; Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Norton & Herek, 2013). Yet an important distinction should be drawn between transphobic attitudes and homophobic attitudes: the former gender minority group is broad and includes transsexuals, transgenderists, cross-dressers and transvestites. The "problem" at the core of transphobia has to do with gender identity rather than sexual orientation (Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Nagoshi et al., 2008). Hill and Willoughby (2005) developed a scale for measuring the three different components of transphobic attitudes: first, "genderism" is the entire set of cognitive beliefs based on the heteronormative social model, the ideal of sexual dimorphism, and the rejection of those who do not behave according to their birth

sex. Second, there is the affective component of transphobia, which centres on an aversion to feminine men, masculine women, cross-dressers, and/or transsexuals. Third, there is the behavioural component, which may encompass violence and "gender bashing" (Carrera-Fernández et al., 2013; Willoughby et al., 2010). As with sexist and homophobic attitudes, a distinction is drawn between transphobia and transnegativity, which is more subtle. Transnegativity is not phobic, but demonstrates some degree of discrepancy between attitude, affect, and behaviour. For example, a transnegative individual might agree that transpeople should be free to express themselves but simultaneously feel uncomfortable being around them or interacting with them (Motmans, Meier, & T'Sjoen, 2013).

As mentioned above, more subtle negative attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities have emerged in Western societies in recent decades. In this paper, however, we use the umbrella terms "sexism", "homophobia", and "transphobia", as we believe they better reflect the variety of aspects we wish to measure among the available scales. Moreover, these umbrella terms are more frequently used in day-to-day life than are the more specific sub-terms.

Determinants in predicting sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes

The use of stereotypes and prejudices is universal: it helps to reduce insecurity in our interactions with others. Yet not all individuals rely on stereotypes to the same extent. The literature describes three sets of variables for predicting sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes: demographic variables, ideological convictions, and the social environment.

Demographic variables are important predictors of sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes. Older people, men, and less-educated people are generally less tolerant of LGBT people and have more rigid beliefs regarding gender (Herek, 2002; Landén & Innala, 2000; Lehavot & Lambert, 2007; Lim, 2002; Norton & Herek, 2013; Winter & Webster, 2008). Prejudice towards sexual and gender minorities among men is likely to originate from hostility towards those who violate traditional gender roles and norms out of fear that this violation might upset male social dominance. Prejudice towards sexual and gender minorities among women are more often rooted in conservative ideological opinions (Nagoshi et al., 2008). The effect of age can probably be explained by the generation effect (Keleher & Smith, 2012): older, more conservative generations are gradually being replaced by younger, more tolerant generations (Kuyper et al., 2013). Although the effect of age on homophobia has already been established, the effect is not always found when using the Genderism and Transphobia Scale (GTS) (Willoughby et al., 2010). Highly educated people tend to be more tolerant of homosexual people, but exceptions have been found when using scales which measure modern homonegativity (Adolfsen, Iedema, & Keuzenkamp, 2010). With regard to sexual orientation, heterosexual people tend to be more homophobic and transphobic than non-heterosexual people (Willoughby et al., 2010).

Second, ideological convictions play an important role in predicting sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes (Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Willoughby et al., 2010). Social dominance has its roots in the desire to maintain the social hierarchy and in the belief that some social groups are better than others (Lippa & Arad, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Such convictions tend to be closely related to prejudices, especially prejudices regarding gender differences and social inequality (Brown, 2010). People with religious convictions are significantly less tolerant of sexual and gender minorities than are people with no specific religious convictions (Collier, Bos, Merry, & Sandfort, 2012; Willoughby et al., 2010).

A third factor in predicting attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities is the social environment. Contact between different social groups has been proven to reduce intergroup prejudices (Christ et al., 2014; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). This is also the case for attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities (Herek & Capitanio, 1996; Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Tee & Hegarty, 2006). People who know homosexual and/or transgender people are typically more tolerant of these groups. Cultural geographical factors such as ethnic origin and place of residence may also play a role in explaining social attitudes and prejudices. For example, people who live in rural areas are generally less tolerant of sexual minorities (van Wijk et al., 2005).

Method and measures

Data collection

The "Beyond the Box" survey was conducted online in October and November 2013 and was available in three languages (Dutch, French, and English). Paper versions of the questionnaire were also available on request. Participation was voluntary and respondents were recruited by means of an open call distributed through various media channels (online media, social media, and national radio) and civil society organisations. Incentives (gift certificates) were raffled among the participants.

Online surveys such as the one used in this study allow for large samples to be surveyed in a short period of time and in a relatively cheap and simple fashion (Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, & Zeichner, 2001; Chivers & Bailey, 2000; Evans & Mathur, 2005; Solomon, 2001; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). The use of an anonymous online convenience sample also results in fewer socially desirable answers and is the preferred method for investigating sensitive matters, such as questions about sexual identity (Tourangeau, Couper, & Steiger, 2003; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). However, the method also has a number of limitations. First, such a sample is self-selected, which can lead to bias (Bethlehem, 2010). However, previous research has shown that participants from self-selected samples provide clearer, more complete responses than participants who are not self-selected, because of their stronger motivation to engage in the survey (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, &

John, 2004). Second, it is impossible to guarantee that the population that has access to the Internet is representative of the population as a whole (Rainie, 2003; Solomon, 2001). Yet, given our aim of including enough participants from gender and sexual minorities, a convenience sample was the preferred option. In a representative sample, sexual and gender minorities would make up only a very small portion of the research sample. Consequently, no significant statistical analysis of the background variables would have been possible.

Measures

Various dimensions of the concept of gender were investigated: sex registered at birth (m/f); intersexuality (y/n); gender role (two questions on 7-point Likert scale, one on the female gender role and one on the male gender role); gender identity (two questions on 7-point Likert scale, one on the female gender identity and one on the male gender identity); self-identification (list of terms) and possible desire to adapt the body medically to the experienced gender perception. The questions were largely based on the research of Kuyper (2012). Based on the variables "male gender identity", "female gender identity", and "gender self-identification", a new variable "*gender*" was constructed, independent of birth sex. Male gender identity was assigned when a respondent had reported identifying more as male than female; the same procedure applied to female gender identity. Respondents were labelled as having "ambivalent gender identity" when their answers on the male and female identity scales were neither outspokenly male nor outspokenly female and when their answers were inconsistent (both extremely male and female). Respondents whose gender identity (male, female, or ambivalent) did not correspond to their birth sex (male or female) were considered to be transgender. Respondents whose gender identity corresponded to their birth sex were considered to be cisgender.

Sexual orientation was measured using three scales: sexual desire or attraction ("Considering your life as a whole, do you feel sexually attracted to women, to men, or to both?"); sexual behaviour ("Considering your life as a whole, to what extent have you had sexual contact with women, men, or both?"); and self-definition ("Please use the following scale to rate how you would describe your own sexuality at this time. You may also assign an intermediate rating") (Elaut, Caen, Dewaele, & Van Houdenhove, 2013; Savin-Williams, 2009). All questions consisted of 7-point Likert scale items (1 = "only women" or "exclusively heterosexual" and 7 = "only men" or "exclusively homosexual"). The options "asexual", "I don't consider gender important", "I don't know", and "other" were also included. Homosexual orientation was assigned when a respondent reported experiencing more homosexual than heterosexual attraction, behaviour, or identification for at least one of the three components. "Other sexual orientation" was assigned when a respondent answered with one of the alternative options (i.e. not on the 7-point Likert scale) for at least one of the three questions.

We used a shortened version of the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO) (14 items). This shortened version had already been translated into Dutch and validated for the purposes of previous Belgian research (Van Hiel & Duriez, n.d.).

The Genderism scale (10 items) consisted of 5-point Likert items that measured the respondents' views and beliefs about sex and gender. The scale was based on the "Beliefs about gender" and "Transpersons beliefs" scales (Tee & Hegarty, 2006).

All of the following scales consisted of 7-point Likert items. The sexism scale (23 items) was based on the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) (1996) and the Ambivalence Toward Men Inventory (AMI) (1999), both developed by Glick and Fiske, as well as the Modern Sexism Scale, developed by Ekehammar et al. (2000). The scale, therefore, covered various aspects of sexist attitudes (traditional sexism towards women and men and modern sexist attitudes toward women).

The homophobia scale (29 items) was based on previous research (Adolfsen et al., 2010; European Commission, 2012; Keuzenkamp, 2010; van Wijk et al., 2005), to which 5 extra items on current political issues in Belgium were added. The scale covered various aspects of homophobia (homonegativity, biphobia, homophobia towards gay men versus lesbian women) and addressed cognitive, affective, and behavioural attitudes.

The transphobia scale (23 items) was based on the Genderism and Transphobia scale (Hill & Willoughby, 2005), the transphobia scale developed by Walch et al. (2012), Dutch research (Kuyper, 2012), and the transphobia scale of Nagoshi et al. (2008). The scale covered various aspects of transphobia, including cognitive, affective, and behavioural attitudes. Items used in previous research were selected according to their suitability for the Belgian context; 5 new items on current political issues related to the transcommunity were added.

The Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (short form) (Reynolds, 1982) were added to the survey to assure the discriminant validity of the results.

Various social, economic, and demographic variables were surveyed: region of residence, type of residence (urban/rural), age (in years), level of education (< ISCED level 6 coded as lower educated and > ISCED level 5 as higher educated[1]), employment situation, household composition, income, religious/philosophical beliefs, minority group status (based on sexual orientation, transgender identity, ethnic origin, religious convictions, and disability), and existing contact with (other) minority groups (family, friends, and acquaintances belonging to one or more of the above-mentioned minority groups).

Data analysis

In order to distinguish different dimensions among the sexism, homophobia, and transphobia scales, we first conducted a factor analysis. Second, we conducted a stepwise multivariate regression on the general sexist, homophobia, and transpho-

1 Resolution concerning the Revision of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)

bia scales and their various dimensions. Predictors were selected on the basis of the research question and the existing literature. Multiple independent variables were correlated and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)/tolerance tests were conducted to exclude multicollinearity. Predictors which had high, strong, or significant correlations were tested for interaction effects. For some scales and subscales, we found meaningful interaction effects in which the ideological predictors (Social dominance and Genderism) interacted with education, gender, and sexual orientation. These interaction effects were added to our model.

Research model

Social dominance
Genderism
Age
Educational level (ISCED)
Gender
Stereotypical gender role
Transidentity
Sexual preference LGB
Sexual preference Other
Place of residence
Contact with (other) minority groups
Religious convictions
Social dominance * gender
Social dominance * education
Genderism * gender
Genderism * educational level
Genderism * Sexual orientation LGB
Genderism * Contact with (other) minority groups
Gender * Stereotypical gender role

>

Sexist attitudes
/ Homophobic attitudes
/ Transphobic attitudes

Results

Response

Of the 8,758 surveys started by our respondents, 6,063 surveys were completed. The drop-out rate can be partly explained by the forced response for several questions. We refined the sample further by checking answers to the open question: respondents whose answer to this question indicated that they were not taking the survey seriously were removed from the sample. Only respondents who were living in Belgium at the time, who were over 16 years old and who had spent 10

minutes or more finishing the survey were selected (n = 5,624). The distribution of the sample proved to be rather diverse in terms of gender identity and sexual orientation. When compared to Belgian population statistics, however, the sample was somewhat limited in terms of age (underrepresentation of older people), level of education (underrepresentation of less-educated people) and minority groups (underrepresentation of participants from minority ethnic backgrounds, religious participants, and disabled participants). Consequently, the sample could not be considered to be representative of the Belgian population. With regard to the reason for participation, the vast majority of participants stated that their concern for equal opportunities was their main motivation. This trend in the sample could be a consequence of self-selection and should be taken into account when interpreting the findings. Because of difficulties in interpretation we decided to leave the 148 respondents with a gender ambivalent identity out of the analysis. This reduced the sample to 5,476 respondents.

Table 1: Response

Birth sex	Men	Women
Total	2523 (44.9%)	3101 (55.1%)
Heterosexual orientation	1393 (55.4%)	2237 (72.2%)
Transgender	149 (5.9%)	131 (4.2%)
Gender Ambivalent Identity	52 (2.1%)	96 (3.1%)
Mean age in years	35.4	32.1
Minority status	1147 (48.9%)	818 (29.0%)
Religious convictions	945 (37.5%)	1246 (40.2%)
Higher educational level (ISCED > level 6)	1676 (66.4%)	2200 (70.9%)
Mean score on Social dominance (0 = not socially dominant, 56 = most socially dominant)	15.5	10.9
Mean score on Beliefs about gender scale (1 = No rigid gender beliefs, 5 = Rigid gender beliefs)	3.5	4.0

Outcomes

Sexism scale

The reliability of the sexism scale (23 items) was high (Cronbach's Alpha 0.82). Four items had a limited negative impact on reliability and were therefore excluded during factor analysis. Based on this factor analysis, three dimensions could be

distinguished (see appendix for the list of items per factor): *Traditional sexism towards women* (7 items) was characterised by outspokenly negative prejudice towards women (e.g. "Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them"). This dimension was found to be most closely related to expressions of sexism in the day-to-day Belgian context. *Sexism towards men* (6 items), the second dimension, was characterised by outspokenly negative prejudice towards men (e.g. "Men will always fight to have greater control in society than women") and positive prejudice towards women (e.g. "Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility"). The third dimension we distinguished was *modern sexism and machismo* (6 items); this was characterised by minimisation of prevailing gender inequality (e.g. "Society treats men and women equally") and confirmation of traditional positive prejudices towards men in which men are perceived as strong and women as vulnerable (e.g. "Women should be cherished and protected by men"). This third dimension differed from the other dimensions in that it described the prevailing gender role situation rather than outspokenly negative prejudice.

Table 2: Coefficients sexism scales

Predictor	β Sexism	β Traditional sexism towards women	β Sexism towards men	β Modern sexism/ machismo
Social dominance	0.321***	0.344***	0.228***	0.190***
Genderism	0.302***	0.223***	0.198***	0.301***
Age	−0.008	−0.002	0.110***	−0.119***
Educational level (lower/higher)	−0.152***	−0.110***	−0.156***	−0.073***
Gender (male/female)	−0.038	−0.119***	0.245***	−0.155***
Traditional gender role	0.131***	0.074***	0.087***	0.124***
Transidentity (cis/trans)	0.003	−0.016	0.015	0.009
Sexualpref_hetero	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant
Sexualpref_LGB	−0.013	−0.003	0.073***	−0.054**
Sexualpref_Other	−0.043***	−0.016	−0.008	−0.062***
Place of residence (urban/rural)	0.049***	0.029*	0.017	0.060***
Contact with (other) minority groups	−0.034**	−0.021	−0.022	−0.040**
Religious convictions (no/yes)	0.094***	0.060***	0.074***	0.081***

Predictor	β Sexism	β Traditional sexism towards women	β Sexism towards men	β Modern sexism/ machismo
Social dominance * gender	–0.003	0.029*	– 0.049**	–0.042**
Social dominance * education	0.055***	0.040**	0.025	0.058***
Genderism * gender	0.008	–0.040**	0.066***	–0.004
Genderism * educational level	0.007	0.011	0.008	–0.020
Genderism * Sexual orientation LGB	0.014	0.027*	0.028	0.002
Genderism * Contact with (other) minority groups	0.025*	0.035**	0.002	0.018
Gender * Traditional gender role	0.003	0.018	–0.016	–0.010

Besides social dominance and rigid gender beliefs, educational level, behaving according to traditional gender roles, and religious conviction were also found to be important predictors of sexist attitudes. Other significant variables, albeit with smaller effects, were place of residence, less diverse social contacts, and sexual orientation: respondents who had been assigned "Other" sexual orientation were found to be less sexist. Significant interaction was observed between education and socially dominant attitudes: social dominance was found to be a stronger predictor of sexist attitudes among more highly educated respondents.

Depending on the dimension, significant differences could be distinguished: younger respondents were generally less sexist towards men than were older respondents, but also had more modern sexist attitudes. Men were generally found to be more sexist than women. Sexism towards men was a notable exception: women exhibited more sexist attitudes with regard to that dimension. Sexually "Other" respondents were generally found to be less sexist than heterosexual and homosexual respondents. Again, sexism towards men was an exception: homosexual respondents were more sexist towards men, especially gay men, than were respondents in the other sexuality groups. Among the various subscales, we observed a range of significant interaction effects: social dominance and genderism were the main effects that interacted with education and gender.

Homophobia scale

The reliability of the homophobia scale (29 items) was high (Cronbach's Alpha 0.94). Only one item had a negative impact on reliability. This item was not excluded, owing to the limited degree of impact, the high reliability of the scale as a whole, and the relevant content of the item. Based on the factor analysis, five dimensions could be distinguished (see appendix for the list of items per

factor). However, the fifth dimension contained only one item ("There should be more possibilities for anonymous and free HIV testing"). Accordingly, we selected only four dimensions. The first of these, *general traditional homophobia* (15 items), was characterised by negative cognitive and affective attitudes towards homosexuality (e.g. "Gay men are not actually real men"). The second dimension, *political and institutional homophobia* (5 items), was characterised by criticism of the institutional and legal framework for the equal treatment and rights of homosexual people (e.g. "There is a need for a law to provide legal arrangements regarding surrogacy for gay couples"). Third, *social homophobia* (5 items) was characterised by fear or rejection of homosexual people in the respondent's own social environment (e.g. "I would have no problem having an LGB person as a neighbour"). Finally, *active homophobia* (3 items) was characterised by outspokenly negative behaviour towards homosexual people (e.g. "I have used violence (e.g. kicking, punching) against LGB people in the past"). Some items scored high on both social and active homophobia (e.g. "If my best friend told me that he/she was gay/lesbian/bisexual, I would break off the friendship").

Table 3: Coefficients homophobia scales

Predictor	β Homophobia	β General traditional homophobia	β Political and institutional homophobia	β Active homophobia	β Social homophobia
Social dominance	0.235***	0.210***	0.210***	0.187***	0.173***
Genderism	0.425***	0.443***	0.370***	0.170***	0.232***
Age	0.105***	0.099***	0.160***	−0.109***	0.083***
Educational level (lower/higher)	−0.031***	−0.050***	0.012	−0.009	−0.033*
Gender (male/female)	−0.054***	−0.013	−0.053***	−0.192***	−0.062***
Traditional gender role	0.092***	0.104***	0.046***	0.077***	0.054***
Transidentity (cis/trans)	−0.006	−0.011	−0.006	−0.006	0.009
Sexualpref_hetero	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant
Sexualpref_LGB	−0.198***	−0.168***	−0.237***	−0.124***	−0.121***
Sexualpref_Other	−0.030**	−0.023*	−0.034**	−0.059***	−0.004
Place of residence (urban/rural)	0.003	0.009	−0.020	0.021	0.003
Contact with (other) minority groups	−0.014	−0.017	0.004	0.004	−0.026*
Religious convictions (no/yes)	0.067***	0.087***	0.049***	0.000	0.013

Predictor	β Homo-phobia	β General traditional homophobia	β Political and institutional homophobia	β Active homophobia	β Social homophobia
Social dominance * gender	-0.025*	-0.004	-0.022	-0.056***	-0.051***
Social dominance * education	-0.001	0.018	0.000	-0.031*	-0.047***
Genderism * gender	-0.101***	-0.077***	-0.082***	-0.063***	-0.154***
Genderism * educa-tional level	-0.065***	-0.069***	-0.029*	-0.027	-0.075***
Genderism * Sexual orientation LGB	-0.161***	-0.138***	-0.156***	-0.037**	-0.191***
Genderism * Contact with (other) minority groups	-0.037***	-0.039***	-0.016	-0.032*	-0.038**
Gender * Traditional gender role	0.023*	0.003	0.030**	0.054***	0.040**

Social dominance and rigid gender beliefs were found to be important predictors of homophobic attitudes. Some groups were significantly more homophobic than others: heterosexual respondents, older respondents, respondents who behave more according to traditional gender roles, less-educated respondents, and respondents who held religious convictions all had more homophobic attitudes. Significant interactions were observed between socially dominant attitudes and gender, and between rigid gender beliefs and gender, education, sexual orientation, and contact with minority groups: social dominance and rigid gender beliefs were found to be less strong predictors of homophobic attitudes among female respondents. Rigid gender beliefs were also less strong predictors among more highly educated respondents, respondents with LGB sexual preferences, and respondents with more diverse social contacts. Significant interaction was observed between gender and traditional gender roles. When the sample was split up by gender, this interaction effect was confirmed: traditional gender behaviour was a significant predictor among both men and women. Among men, the effect of stereotypical gendered behaviour cancelled out the effect of birth sex: the significant predictor lay not in birth sex, but in the degree to which a man exhibited masculine behaviour.

Depending on the dimension, significant differences could be distinguished: younger respondents were less homophobic in all dimensions with the exception of the behavioural component (active homophobia). Higher educated respondents were less homophobic with the exception of the political and institutional dimension. Respondents who had religious convictions were generally more homophobic. However, the effect of religion was not found to be significant for the dimensions of social and active homophobia: it appears that negative attitudes were not translated into active exclusion or negative behaviour. We observed a range of significant inter-

action effects among the various subscales, the most important of which were social dominance, which interacted with education and gender for social homophobia, and genderism, which interacted with gender, education, sexual orientation, and diverse social contacts.

Although several items on lesbophobia and biphobia had been added to the homophobia scale, factor analysis did not reveal them to be separate dimensions. In our sample, no significant differences were found between attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women, and bisexual people did not appear to experience double discrimination from both heterosexual and homosexual respondents. Tolerance of bisexual people was found to be higher among gay men than among lesbian women.

Transphobia scale

The reliability of the transphobia scale (23 items) was high (Cronbach's Alpha 0.92). Two items had a moderately negative impact on reliability but were not excluded, owing to their limited effect and the high reliability of the scale as a whole. Based on a factor analysis, four dimensions could be distinguished. First, *general traditional transphobia* (15 items) was characterised by negative cognitive and affective attitudes towards transpeople (e.g. "Transgender people are just secretly homosexual"). The second dimension, *political and institutional transphobia* (5 items), was characterised by criticism of the institutional and legal framework for the equal treatment of transpeople (e.g. "People should have to pay for their own sex-change operations"). Third, *active transphobia* (4 items) was characterised by outspokenly negative behaviour towards transpeople (e.g. "I have laughed at a woman because she looked too masculine or behaved in an overly masculine manner"). Finally, *social transphobia* (2 items) was characterised by fear or rejection of transpeople in the respondent's own social environment (e.g. "I would have no problem having a transgendered person as a close colleague"). One item which was predicted to score high on social transphobia actually scored surprisingly high on political and institutional transphobia (e.g. "I would be able to have a relationship with a transsexual person").

Table 4: Coefficients transphobia scales

Predictor	β Transphobia	β General Transphobia	β Political and institutional transphobia	β Active transphobia	β Social transphobia
Social dominance	0.228***	0.216***	0.109***	0.194***	0.110***
Genderism	0.512***	0.532***	0.312***	0.192***	0.233***
Age	-0.029**	-0.008	-0.020	-0.116***	-0.004
Educational level (lower/higher)	-0.004	0.003	-0.029*	0.013	-0.022
Gender (male/female)	-0.090***	-0.074***	0.005	-0.161***	-0.053**
Traditional gender role	0.069***	0.071***	0.024	0.050***	0.025
Transidentity (cis/trans)	-0.044***	-0.050***	-0.043**	-0.024	0.025

Predictor	β Trans-phobia	β General Transphobia	β Political and institutional transphobia	β Active transphobia	β Social transphobia
Sexualpref_hetero	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant	Constant
Sexualpref_LGB	−0.130***	−0.147***	−0.039*	−0.032*	−0.057***
Sexualpref_Other	−0.055***	−0.054***	−0.047***	−0.018	−0.027
Place of residence (urban/rural)	0.019*	0.013	0.043**	0.007	0.012
Contact with (other) minority groups	−0.028**	−0.021*	−0.031*	−0.011	−0.037**
Religious convictions (no/yes)	0.056***	0.059***	0.049***	0.001	0.026
Social dominance * gender	−0.024*	−0.013	−0.023	−0.042**	−0.027
Social dominance * education	0.019	0.026**	0.015	−0.012	−0.005
Genderism * gender	−0.083***	−0.081***	0.004	−0.064***	−0.083***
Genderism * educational level	−0.041***	−0.046***	0.027	−0.012	−0.055***
Genderism * Sexual orientation LGB	−0.067***	−0.070***	−0.004	−0.009	−0.086***
Genderism * Contact with (other) minority groups	0.000	−0.008	0.035*	−0.018	0.021
Gender * Traditional gender role	0.018	0.021*	−0.011	0.020	0.000

Social dominance and rigid gender beliefs were found to be important predictors of transphobic attitudes. As with the homophobia scale, certain respondent groups proved to be significantly more transphobic than others, namely heterosexual respondents, those who had male gender identity, those who behave more according to traditional gender roles, those with religious convictions, cisgender respondents, and those whose social environments are less diverse. Significant interaction effects were observed: social dominance and rigid gender beliefs were less strong predictors of transphobic attitudes among female respondents. Rigid gender beliefs were also a less strong predictor for more highly educated respondents and respondents with LGB sexual preferences.

Depending on the dimension, significant differences could be identified: younger respondents were less transphobic in all dimensions with the exception of the behavioural component (active transphobia). This could be explained by the item on verbal abuse, on which younger respondents scored higher than older respondents. In general, women and respondents with less traditional gender role behaviour were found to be less transphobic. These effects were not significant for

political and institutional transphobia. Respondents who had religious convictions were generally found to be more transphobic, but the effect was not significant for the social and active transphobia dimensions. Again, it appears that negative attitudes were not being translated into actual behaviour. A range of significant interaction effects is observed among the various subscales: social dominance and rigid gender beliefs were the main effects.

Discussion

"Beyond the Box" was the first comprehensive study of sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes to be conducted in Belgium. The study covered multiple dimensions and aspects of these attitudes and several background variables, some of which (e.g. gender identity and role) had not previously been included in a general survey of the Belgian population. The systematic, holistic research design used in the research represents a significant contribution to the existing literature, which had previously been confined mainly to student samples and traditional social and demographic background variables. We were able to make a number of significant links between these background variables and social dominance, genderism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia because of this comprehensive approach.

First, our findings demonstrate that prejudices still persist both about and among women and men and those whose behaviour does not conform to gender stereotypes, even in our relatively young, highly educated sample. Broader ideological convictions such as socially dominant and rigid gender attitudes were repeatedly found to be the strongest predictors of sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes. Sexist, transphobic, and homophobic attitudes can largely be predicted by the same rigid gender beliefs and social dominant attitudes.

Second, the analyses allow us to conclude that certain social groups typically have more sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes: men, the elderly, heterosexual respondents, those with religious convictions, and those whose social environments are less diverse. Furthermore, the findings show significant differences between the different scales and their dimensions: age, for instance, had a significant effect on sexist and homophobic attitudes. Younger respondents were found to have less sexist and homophobic attitudes than older respondents, but the same effect was not found for transphobia. This is in line with earlier findings (Keleher & Smith, 2012; Willoughby et al., 2010). Younger respondents were also found to score high on active homophobia and transphobia (the behavioural component), which can be explained by their high scores on items measuring verbal aggression and the pejorative use of homosexual slang towards gender non-conformist people. This means that younger respondents, who have grown up in a social context in which equal rights are highly valued, tend to have tolerant beliefs, but that these beliefs do not always lead to tolerant and positive behaviour. We assume that an explanation

can be found in underlying heteronormative assumptions and binary gender roles, which are still taken to be the standard (Walch et al., 2012).

Likewise, differences according to gender were found: in general, men were found to have more sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes. Interaction effects showed that social dominance was a less strong predictor, and rigid gender beliefs and strong stereotypical gender behaviour were stronger predictors among female respondents for having tolerant attitudes. Moreover, we observed that respondents who behave according to traditional gender roles had more sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes. When the analysis was split according to gender and the results were studied more in detail, these remarkable differences that emerged between men and women with regard to homophobic and transphobic attitudes were confirmed. Among men, gender identity (how masculine one feels) and stereotypically gendered behaviour (how masculine one's behaviour is) both had a strong negative effect on tolerant attitudes. Among women, however, gender identity and stereotypically gendered behaviour were less clear-cut predictors of attitude: the more feminine women felt (gender identity) and the less stereotypically they behaved, the more tolerant attitudes they had. Likewise, religious convictions have a significant effect among women, but not among men. These findings seem to indicate that the origins of sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes are different in men and women, thus confirming the earlier findings of Nagoshi et al. (2008). It could be argued, for example, that the negative attitudes of men originate from a desire to reject and punish when traditional gender roles and norms are violated, because of the fear that such violations might undermine existing male social dominance. The negative attitudes of women, on the other hand, appear to originate from conservative, ideological beliefs, such as religious worldviews and stereotypical and traditional gender beliefs.

The expectation that a higher level of education would lead to more tolerant attitudes was not confirmed for all of the attitudes surveyed in this study. Sexist attitudes were found to be mediated by education, as were homophobic attitudes—albeit only in part. This was not the case for transphobic attitudes. Second, education was also found to interact with social dominance and genderism on various scales and subscales. More specifically, the main effect of genderism was observed to be less strong among highly educated respondents.

The effect of social environment was significant for all attitude scales: respondents who had more diverse social contacts (family, friends, and acquaintances) were found to have less negative sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes. However, it should also be taken into account that more tolerant attitudes may actually be the cause of intergroup contact rather than the result (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). The current survey does not provide sufficient information to give an answer to this question regarding possible causality.

Certain findings from previous studies were not confirmed by our analyses. For example, we found that homosexual men and women had less sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes, with the exception of sexism towards men.

Gay men, in particular, were found to be more sexist towards other men than were heterosexual men. While biphobia was not identified as a separate dimension in our study, LGB men and women were nevertheless found to have significantly less biphobic attitudes than heterosexual men and women. The hypothesis that bisexual people experience double discrimination (Mulick & Wright, 2008) was not confirmed in our sample. Transrespondents were not found to be significantly less homophobic than cisrespondents.

An important limitation of the survey presented here concerns the representativeness of the sample. As mentioned above, the self-selected sample could not be considered representative of the entire Belgian population. The vast majority of respondents also stated that their main reason for participating in the survey was their concern for equal opportunities. Research has indicated that self-selected samples of respondents participating in web-based surveys may be more motivated to participate than non-self-selected samples of respondents because of their interest in the topic (Gosling & Mason, 2015; Gosling et al., 2004) and this appears to have been the case here. Because of this self-selection bias, caution should be employed when generalising the findings of the survey to the wider Belgian population. Less tolerant groups (e.g. lower educational level, the elderly) were underrepresented in the sample (Kuyper et al., 2013). We can assume that the actual attitudes of the Belgian population are less tolerant than indicated here.

In sum, the findings from the comprehensive "Beyond the Box" survey reveal several challenges to those involved in promoting equal opportunities. First, we observe that despite the strong legal framework established in Belgium in the last decade and the general rejection of homophobic and transphobic beliefs by the majority of our respondents, consensus was sometimes lacking on equal rights for homosexual and transgender people (political and institutional dimensions of homophobia and transphobia). Individuals who do not conform to the heteronormative standard may not be openly excluded, but often remain the objects of stigmatisation and prejudice despite anti-discrimination laws and equality policies. Hence, sexist, homophobic, and transphobic prejudices are still common and remain rooted in rigid gender belief systems. In order to combat negative attitudes towards LGBT people, the focus must be placed on altering heteronormative and rigid gender beliefs in society. Second, it appears that an individual's overall gender beliefs and related sexist, homophobic, and transphobic attitudes are influenced by their own gender identity and role identification, rather than by birth sex alone. Further investigation is required to clarify this influence. Therefore, we suggest that future studies, especially those employing general surveys, include standardised questions on sexual orientation and gender identity in order to gain insight into these variables among more general and diverse samples of the population. Third, our findings indicate that age is an important predictor of attitudes but also that this age effect is not always linear or significant for every subscale. The discrepancy between formal and informal equality was especially pronounced among younger generations. Due to the sample and purpose of this study, how-

ever, the nature and origins of these age effects remain unclear. Additional representative and systematic follow-up studies could provide further insight into this matter. Fourth, the sample used in this study lacked ethnic and cultural diversity. As current debates in Belgium often ascribe sexist, homophobic, and transphobic violence to individuals from certain minority ethnic backgrounds (Moroccan and Turkish), it is relevant for both social scientists and policymakers to determine whether or not real differences can be observed in this respect. Finally, the data itself suggest a number of means for achieving more acceptance in Belgian daily life. For example, diverse social contacts and education were found to be related to more positive attitudes. Consequently, it could be argued that establishing diverse social environments and adequate information in the workplace, classroom, popular media, and sports is essential to developing tolerant attitudes. Ultimately, it is clear that achieving an understanding of gender as going beyond the dual female/male boxes lies at the core of ensuring positive attitudes.

Conclusion

The "Beyond the Box" survey examined for the first time sexist, homophobic, lesbophobic, biphobic, and transphobic attitudes, with attention to different aspects such as cognitive beliefs, affects, and behaviour. Further, the survey employed various background variables, such as sexual orientation, gender identity, gender role, and sex assigned at birth. Some of these have never been studied before in a Belgian survey sample. The findings allow us, firstly, to distinguish intersections between social dominance, genderism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia on the one hand and background variables which surpass traditional social, economic, and demographic variables on the other hand. Secondly, the results show that, despite anti-discrimination laws and equality policies in Belgium, sexist, homophobic, and transphobic prejudices remain widespread and are rooted in rigid gender belief systems. The current study also indicates that, in order to create more positive attitudes towards sexual and gender minorities, we must start by addressing heteronormative and rigidly dualistic gender beliefs.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Factor loadings: sexism scale

Item	Factor 1 Traditional sexism towards women	Factor 2 Sexism towards men	Factor 3 Modern sexism/ machismo
In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.	/	/	/
Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.	*0.591*	0.301	0.161
People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a member of the other sex.	/	/	/
Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men (reverse).	*0.643*	–0.016	0.163
Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.	–0.065	*0.629*	0.200
Women should be cherished and protected by men.	–0.043	0.390	*0.459*
Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.	*0.542*	0.352	0.231
When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.	*0.626*	0.344	0.162
A man who is sexually attracted to a woman typically has no morals about doing whatever it takes to get her in bed.	0.243	*0.630*	–0.022
Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies than women are.	0.261	0.346	*0.421*
Men act like babies when they are sick.	0.085	*0.660*	–0.166
Men will always fight to have greater control in society than women.	0.069	*0.661*	–0.132
Women ought to take care of their men at home, because men would fall apart if they had to fend for themselves.	0.099	0.531	0.287
Men are more capable than women of taking the lead.	0.272	0.214	*0.617*
Women are more capable than men of taking care of others.	0.019	*0.548*	0.482
Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in this country.	0.316	–0.012	*0.726*
Humiliating treatment of women in adverts is usual.	/	/	/
Society treats men and women the same way.	0.208	–0.091	*0.714*
The government puts too much emphasis on women's issues.	*0.603*	0.105	0.390
The women's movement serves no purpose and should be abolished.	*0.612*	0.040	0.394
It is easy to understand the viewpoints of women's groups (reverse).	*0.644*	–0.110	0.018

Item	Factor 1 Traditional sexism towards women	Factor 2 Sexism towards men	Factor 3 Modern sexism/ machismo
The school curriculum should be adapted to boys' needs.	/	/	/
Better measures should be taken to achieve equality (between sexes) in workplace (reverse).	0.319	–0.190	*0.517*

* Items that load high on factor are marked in italics

Appendix 2: Factor loadings: homophobia scale

Item	Factor 1 General homophobia	Factor 2 Political and institutional homophobia	Factor 3 Active homophobia	Factor 4 Social homophobia	Factor 5 HIV item
Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish.	0.233	0.373	0.266	0.388	0.058
I think the fight for equal rights for LGB people is going too far.	0.514	*0.580*	*0.256*	0.082	0.070
Gay men are not actually real men.	*0.605*	0.301	0.386	0.232	0.063
Lesbian women are not actually real women.	*0.587*	0.239	0.396	0.247	0.063
Gay men flaunt their sexual orientation.	*0.582*	0.399	0.362	–0.112	0.064
Lesbians flaunt their sexual orientation.	*0.581*	0.334	0.407	–0.101	0.047
Bisexual men spread AIDS to heterosexuals.	*0.531*	0.265	0.341	0.062	0.105
Bisexual women are oversexed.	*0.612*	0.178	0.389	–0.001	0.116
Bisexuals are not to be trusted.	*0.584*	0.123	0.363	0.159	0.057
People are either heterosexual or homosexual/lesbian.	*0.646*	0.084	0.103	0.118	0.036
Bisexuals are people who are confused about their sexuality.	*0.712*	0.184	0.139	0.118	0.043
I consider sex between two lesbians disgusting.	*0.706*	0.202	0.060	0.244	0.024
I consider sex between two homosexual men disgusting.	*0.697*	0.348	0.092	0.205	0.055
I am offended when two men kiss each other in public.	*0.699*	0.420	0.082	0.163	0.038
I am offended when two women kiss each other in public.	*0.712*	0.351	0.040	0.185	0.016

Item	Factor 1 General homophobia	Factor 2 Political and institutional homophobia	Factor 3 Active homophobia	Factor 4 Social homophobia	Factor 5 HIV item
If a friend/acquaintance (of the same sex as me) were to tell me that he/she was gay/lesbian/bisexual, I would be afraid that he/she might have feelings for me.	*0.552*	0.101	0.265	0.286	0.089
I sometimes use gay-related terms to express something negative (e.g. 'That's so gay', 'What a dyke', 'That's for sissies').	/	/	/	/	/
I have shouted insults at LGBT people in the past.	0.121	0.134	*0.691*	0.165	0.011
I have used violence (e.g. kicking, punching) against LGB people in the past.	0.110	−0.018	*0.673*	0.208	0.067
I would be able to have a relationship with a bisexual partner.	*0.570*	0.213	−0.275	0.183	0.044
If my best friend told me that he/she was gay/lesbian/bisexual, I would break off the friendship.	0.380	0.171	*0.487*	*0.466*	0.079
Children should learn starting in kindergarten that it is normal to be LGB.	0.365	*0.681*	0.025	0.114	0.046
At the birth of their child, lesbian couples should have the same rights as heterosexual couples do with regard to registration/recognition.	0.254	*0.706*	0.159	0.212	0.058
The government should make foreign adoption easier for LGBT people.	0.258	*0.788*	0.083	0.130	0.115
There is a need for a law to provide legal arrangements regarding surrogacy for gay couples.	0.187	*0.748*	0.057	0.141	0.123
There should be more possibilities for anonymous and free HIV testing.	0.094	0.132	0.067	0.121	0.975
LGBT people should not be allowed to work with children.	0.352	0.286	*0.411*	0.336	0.032
I would have no problem having an LGBT person as a close colleague.	0.206	0.176	0.193	*0.763*	0.110
I would have no problem having an LGBT person as a neighbour.	0.174	0.165	0.176	*0.778*	125

* Items that load high on factor are marked in italics

Appendix 3: Factor loadings: transphobia scale

Item	Factor 1 General transphobia	Factor 2 Political and institutional transphobia	Factor 3 Active transphobia	Factor 4 Social transphobia
People who do not clearly feel male or female should be fully accepted in our society.	*0.562*	0.224	0.058	0.319
Transvestites should be prohibited from cross-dressing in public.	*0.656*	0.327	0.093	0.165
If someone has carefully thought about changing his or her sex, surgery would be a good idea.	*0.535*	0.367	-0.049	0.181
Transgendered people are just secretly homosexual.	0.644	0.346	0.070	0.070
When meeting people, I consider it important to know whether they are male or female.	0.303	*0.507*	0.269	0.061
People should have to pay for their own sex-change operations.	0.361	*0.622*	0.114	-0.028
I would have no problem having a transgendered person as a close colleague.	0.257	0.170	0.089	*0.860*
I think it's terrible that transgendered people have operations performed on healthy bodies.	0.644	0.419	0.043	0.090
I would have no problem having a transgendered person as a neighbour.	0.272	0.150	0.064	*0.859*
Effeminate men make me feel uncomfortable.	*0.588*	0.284	0.315	0.119
Masculine women make me feel uncomfortable.	*0.572*	0.255	0.276	0.085
I have used violence (e.g. kicking, punching) against a woman for being too masculine.	/	/	/	/
I have used violence (e.g. kicking, punching) against a man for being too effeminate.	*0.628*	-0.232	0.259	0.060
I have laughed at a man because he looked too effeminate or behaved in an overly effeminate manner.	0.202	0.180	*0.868*	0.072
I have laughed at a woman because she looked too masculine or behaved in an overly masculine manner.	0.192	0.116	*0.885*	0.062
I prefer not to associate with people who are not clearly male or female.	*0.647*	0.309	0.246	0.236
The government should make foreign adoption easier for transgendered people.	0.360	*0.639*	0.026	0.189
Transgendered people should no longer be required to undergo hormonal treatment as a condition for changing their first names.	/	/	/	/
Children should learn about transgendered people starting in kindergarten.	0.225	*0.700*	0.065	0.089

Item	Factor 1 General transphobia	Factor 2 Political and institutional transphobia	Factor 3 Active transphobia	Factor 4 Social transphobia
Sterilisation (irreversible infertility) should no longer be a prerequisite for a sex change.	0.172	*0.512*	0.035	0.187
Transgendered people should not be allowed to work with children.	0.673	0.297	0.106	0.234
If a friend/acquaintance were to tell me that he/she wanted to undergo gender reassignment, I would break off the friendship.	*0.744*	0.160	0.170	0.267
I would be able to have a relationship with a transsexual person.	0.021	*0.712*	0.160	0.101

* Items that load high on factor are marked in italics

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2

Anti-Gay Propaganda Laws: Time for the European Court of Human Rights to Overcome Her Fear of Commitment

Justine De Kerf

Abstract

In 2013, President Putin signed a new federal law prohibiting propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships. Since then, it is against the law to spread positive information about gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender people (LGBT) among minors. Allegedly, children should not be misguided into believing that non-traditional relationships are equivalent to traditional (heterosexual) relationships. The context in which these laws were created teaches us that they are not an end in themselves but a means to undermine the universality of human rights as they try to make way for traditional Russian values in the international human rights framework. This is a bold statement on sovereignty from a member state of the Council of Europe that ratified the European Convention of Human Rights. How does the Council respond to these laws and do they comply with the provisions of the Convention? This last question must ultimately be answered by the European Court of Human Rights that determines the scope and interpretation of the Convention. This article maintains that the anti-propaganda laws are not only interfering with the right to freedom of speech and assembly, but are also (re)installing second-class citizenship of the LGBT community. If the Convention is fully inclusive towards LGBT people, then this should translate in every judgement of the Court. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As this contribution suggests, the Court needs to strengthen her commitment to guarantee full protection of the convention regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity to gain the moral upper hand when confronted with these anti-propaganda laws.

Keywords

European Court of Human Rights, Russia, LGBT rights, anti-propaganda laws, Alekseyev, Schalk and Kopf

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In 2013, the Russian Federation adopted a new federal law, banning the so-called propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships among minors. The international media quickly referred to the said law as the anti-gay propaganda law, identifying LGBT people as being targeted by this new article in the Russian Code on Administrative offences. After all, the federal ban is not a novelty, but merely a synthesized and edited version of regional anti-propaganda laws that have been in effect in several districts (*oblasts*) in Russia since 2003. There is mounting evidence that these laws, as well as being enforced, are serving to legitimate violence and discrimination towards anyone who challenges heteronormativity or binary gender roles. The law indeed suggests that people who are non-traditional (i.e. gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender) pose a significant threat to traditional Russian values and the moral health of the Russian youth. These anti-gay propaganda laws are, however, not an end in themselves, but a means to undermine the universality of human rights as they try to make way for traditional values in the international human rights framework. Therefore, a historical overview is required to understand the true meaning of these laws and how they came into being.

This article will focus on the reception of the anti-gay propaganda laws by the Council of Europe, the leading human rights organisation in Europe. As a member state, the Russian Federation has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and recognised the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Human rights protection is, however, first and foremost a national matter, allowing the states considerable freedom to decide the level of protection that is afforded. The ECtHR is responsible for safeguarding the minimum standards, enshrined in the ECHR and clarified by the Court's judgements. In order to determine whether the anti-gay propaganda laws are contrary to Russia's obligations under international human rights law, it is imperative to know what the minimum standards are concerning LGBT rights.

The arguments put forward in this article are based on a case-law study of more than fifty Court judgements relating to LGBT rights over the past sixty years (De Kerf, 2015). This contribution, however, does not attempt to provide an exhaustive overview of this case-law, but rather to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the legal protection offered by the Court by means of two representative cases: *Alekseyev v Russia* (2010) and *Schalk and Kopf v Austria* (2010). In doing so, we will try to answer the question whether the human rights protection offered to LGBT people by the European Court of Human Rights is sufficient to counter the harmful effects of the anti-gay propaganda laws.

Historical Perspective

Throughout history, Russia has adopted several stances towards homosexuality. Tsars, the Communist Party, and presidents have all ruled this vast land with their own administration and way of law-making. Yet, there are certain defining charac-

teristics of nineteenth-century Russia that are part of Russia's identity: orthodoxy, a distinct national character, and autocracy (Malfliet, 2010). These same characteristics are reflected in the policy regarding the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender people.

Under the rule of Tsar Nicolas I, homosexuality was first criminalised in 1832. The revolutionaries of the early twentieth century, however, decriminalised homosexuality as part of a broader effort to lift the restrictions on their liberties imposed by the bourgeoisie. This newly gained freedom was short-lived, as Russia became an autocratic regime again, recriminalizing homosexuality in 1934. Under Stalin's rule, gay men were sent to the gulag along with political dissidents, strengthening the criminal connotation (Saunders & Strukuv, 2010). By depicting gay men as a threat to the Soviet State, the regime banned homosexuality to "the realm of silence" (Kondakov, 2013, p. 408).

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Western values surged, suddenly disrupting this silence. Human rights activists seized the opportunity and consequently the first Russian LGBT organisation Krilija (wings) was founded, striving to remove homosexuality from criminal law and turn it into an openly debatable subject. Even though sexuality in general became a hot topic at the time, and the Russian Criminal Code was indeed reformed in 1993, the criminal and moral connotation attached to homosexuality was not publicly challenged (Quince, 2013). The Russian Federation had good reason for (quietly) removing homosexuality from criminal law, as their application for membership of the Council of Europe was now pending.

The Council of Europe was founded for the purpose of increasing unity between the European states and to protect "the ideals and principles which are their common heritage" (Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1), referring to the protection of human rights and the principles of democracy. During the Cold War, this democratic ideal was to prevail over its communist counterpart. In 1996, however, the Council of Europe accepted Russia as a member and with it the task of guiding the successor state to the Soviet Union on the path towards democracy. Russia's transition to a free market economy and democracy, however, left a lot to be desired. While the state-owned assets were privatised and fell into the hands of the oligarchs, the economy was suffering as a result of the mass tax evasion by the latter and the Chechen War, leading to a financial crisis in 1998 (Onwijn, 2006). Meanwhile, the decentralisation of power was a chaotic process, with the new Constitution assigning even more power to the president than the former General Secretary of the Communist Party, and the rise of a war of laws between the new local and federal administrations (Malfliet, 2008).

Although a true democracy was never established, the concept was now tainted. In the eyes of the Russian citizens, democracy connoted instability, corruption, and fraud. They grew tired of Russia being the sick man of Europe and were hankering for a strong leader who could regain the nation's status of a superpower. In response, the last prime minister of the Jeltsin-administration and former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, seemed to tick all the boxes.

The first years of Putin's presidency were marked by strong economic growth and the reinstatement of the Orthodox Church to its pre-communist status as the one "true" Church (Malfliet, 2010; Aslund, 2008). President Putin certainly did not use his two consecutive terms to further the weighty process of turning the Russian Federation into a democratic state. On the contrary, whilst leaving the federal structures laid down in the Constitution untouched, a proliferation of presidential decrees caused radical reforms in the distribution of power. However, discontent was growing in the liberal big cities where people started to raise questions concerning the centralisation of power and the widespread corruption (Dmitriev & Treisman, 2012). In the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections (where Putin's party gained more than fifty per cent of the votes), mass protests broke out on the streets of Moscow, claiming electoral fraud and calling for democracy, freedom, and a Putin-free Russia (Elder, 2011; Gessen, 2013). The Kremlin needed to move fast in order to prevent the discontent from spreading to every far corner of the nation. Effectively using the mechanisms of a personality cult, President Putin was and continues to be portrayed as a strong leader, embodying and protecting traditional Russian values, fully supported by the Orthodox Church (Anderson, 2007). Whoever opposes Putin, so the message seems to be, opposes Russia.

The Kremlin needed a clear-cut enemy against whom Putin could vigorously protect Russia and its values. Multiple reasons can be discerned why LGBT people were chosen to fulfil the role of enemy of the state. First, anti-LGBT attitudes have the full support of the Orthodox Church. Second, the historical overview outlined above shows that LGBT people were an easy target, during a time when silence and ignorance effectively preserved a general homophobic atmosphere. Last and most importantly, Putin wanted to oppose Western values. In Russia "no one represents Western influence and otherness better than gays and lesbians" (Gessen, 2013, par. 9). Under the guise of protecting traditional Russian values, Putin continues to wage a cultural war against an allegedly perverted West. The actual reason why Putin desperately tries to keep Western influence at bay might be that with greater tolerance of diversity comes greater freedom (of expression) and greater government accountability (Wilkinson, 2013; Trudolyubov, 2014).

Anti-propaganda Laws

In 2003, 2004, and again in 2006, a bill was submitted to the Russian State Duma (parliament) seeking to make propaganda on homosexuality a criminal offence (Hammarberg, 2011). The Supreme Court advised against the proposal and the government gave an official rebuttal. The deputy first minister Zhukov stated that propagating homosexuality could not be made a criminal offence because homosexuality in itself was no longer a crime. Although the bill was rejected by the State Duma three times, comparable legislation was passed at the regional level. The oblast Ryazan took the lead in 2006, passing a bill on the Protection of Morality and

Health of Minors, followed by the introduction of a new administrative offence. To engage in any kind of public actions aimed at propaganda of homosexuality is now forbidden, with fines amounting to 2,000 rubles (roughly the equivalent of 200 euro). LGBT-activists Alekseyev, Bayev, and Fedotova appealed against the laws to the Russian Constitutional Court in 2009. They pleaded that the laws were in violation of the Constitution, more specifically of article 19 (prohibition on discrimination), article 29 (freedom of expression), and article 55 (constitutional rights can only be restricted by a federal law). In the judgement of 19 February 2010, the Court argued that the Russian Constitution was not violated, as "the laws do not contain any measures directed at the ban of homosexuality or its official blaming, do not contain features of discrimination, do not, in their essence, allow excessive actions by the state bodies. The ban of such propaganda . . . cannot be considered as breaching the constitutional rights of citizens" (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 19 February 2010). The Court emphasized the need for this type of legislation, stating that:

> The family, motherhood and childhood in the traditional interpretation, received from our ancestors, are the values that provide a continuous change of generations, and are conditions for the preservation and development of the multinational people of the Russian Federation, and therefore require a special state protection. (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 19 February 2010)

In the wake of this judgement, nine more subjects followed suit. Even in Saint Petersburg, often described as the most European city of Russia (Elder, 2012), a bill was submitted containing a legislative prohibition of any public action aimed at "propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism and paedophilia among minors" (ILGA-Europe, 15 November 2011). Despite the reaction of international organisations such as ILGA (2012), Human Rights Watch (2012), and Amnesty International (2011), condemning the bill as discriminatory and flagrantly violating Russia's obligations under international law, the bill passed by a 29-5 vote. Thriving on the recent success in Saint Petersburg and supported by the judgement of the Constitutional Court, the legislative assembly of Novosibirsk submitted an anti-propaganda bill to the State Duma. The bill contained a preamble to elucidate its purpose and to stress its necessity. According to the preamble, the uncontrolled dissemination of information about homosexuality or non-traditional relationships is very dangerous for children and youths, as it leads them to believe that these relationships are socially equivalent to traditional relationships. Following this logic, any public action aimed at the popularisation of homosexuality or its representation as a behavioural norm is forbidden (ARTICLE 19, 2013).

The federal bill passed a first reading by the Duma, but the terminology needed to be more specific, since the bill did not define the term homosexuality (Human Rights First, 2013). In the final version of the bill, every explicit LGBT reference had been replaced by the term non-traditional. The fact that the term "non-tra-

ditional (relationships)" is yet again not defined, did not stop the bill from passing a second reading by the Duma. During a third and final reading that same day, the Duma voted unanimously in favour of the anti-propaganda bill. Neither the many warnings given by NGO's and international human rights bodies, nor the heightened media attention in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi prevented President Putin from signing the bill on 29 June 2013, adding a new article to the Russian Code on Administrative Offences:

> Article 6.21. Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors
> Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors expressed in distribution of information that is aimed at the formation among minors of non-traditional sexual attitudes, attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relations, misperceptions of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual relations, or enforcing information about non-traditional sexual relations that evokes interest to such relations, if these actions do not constitute a criminal offence, is punishable by an administrative fine for citizens in the amount of four thousand to five thousand rubles; for officials—forty thousand to fifty thousand rubles; for legal entities—from eight hundred thousand to one million rubles, or administrative suspension of activities for the period of up to ninety days.

Whatever the font of that signature, President Putin made a bold move. Even though the Russian Constitutional Court supported the bill, Russia remains to this day a member state of the Council of Europe and, therefore, has obligations under international human rights law. Russia has proven stubbornly difficult in the past, not impressed with and even less eager to change national policy to comply with the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (Malfliet, 2008). Even so, Russia did not flagrantly violate the ECHR by recriminalizing homosexuality (criminalisation is forbidden by the ECtHR since the judgement in *Dudgeon v The United Kingdom* in 1981). Instead, the anti-propaganda laws are more subtle, proving that Russia does not wish to alienate itself from the human rights debate, but rather convey a new human rights framework centred on traditional values, ensuring that "LGBT citizens enjoy all the same rights and protections as heterosexual citizens, provided they do not transgress societal norms in public" (Wilkinson, 2013, p. 5).

These laws are not only forcing people to stay in the closet, they also seek to prevent the crucial work of LGBT activists who are striving for equal rights and social acceptance. When ignorance and censorship are an essential part of the problem, then freedom of speech, diffusion of objective information, and visibility could be part of the solution (Ayoub, 2016). One would expect the Council of Europe to send a clear message to a member state that formally endorses the discrimination and stigmatisation of the LGBT community in an attempt to challenge the universality of human rights.

Critical Reception of the Anti-Propaganda Laws

The Council of Europe not only has an aforementioned special history with Russia, but it is also home to the only supranational human rights body in Europe capable of issuing an enforceable judgement in its member states: the European Court of Human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights is a living instrument, interpreted and shaped by the Court's case law. The protection of the LGBT community under the provisions of the Convention has significantly evolved since 1959. To this day, however, there is yet to be a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the regional or federal anti-propaganda laws specifically (multiple cases are pending).

The European Commission of Democracy through Law (an advisory body of the Council of Europe), known as the Venice Commission, was asked to deliver an opinion on the issue of the prohibition of so-called propaganda of homosexuality and its compliance with the Convention and the Court's case law. The anti-propaganda laws are understood to fall within the scope of articles 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly), and 14 (prohibition of discrimination). In her analysis, the Commission applied the same method as the Court itself to decide whether the laws are violating certain convention rights or not (Venice Commission, 2013).

The Commission states that the laws are interfering with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The question is whether this interference is justified. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are qualified rights, meaning that an interference with said rights is not necessarily a violation of the Convention. A justified interference needs to be prescribed by law, serve a legitimate aim, and must be deemed necessary in a democratic society. The prohibition on propaganda of homosexuality or non-traditional sexual relationships seems to meet the first requirement: prescribed by law. The Commission decides, however, that the first condition is not met, because the anti-propaganda laws do not allow Russian citizens to understand and foresee which type of action is prohibited by the law. What is seen as propaganda? Is propaganda forbidden when it is directed at minors or simply among minors?

Even if the first condition was met, the laws do not pursue a legitimate aim and are not necessary in a democratic society. The Commission denounces the protection of morals and the rights of minors as justified grounds for such legislation. The Convention protects homosexuality as a type of sexual orientation, and can, therefore, not oppose the moral standards that come with it. The rights of minors are not protected by prohibiting public debate on homosexuality. On the contrary, it is in their best interest to receive relevant, appropriate, and objective information about sexuality, including homosexuality.

The last part of the Commission's opinion focuses on whether the anti-propaganda laws are compatible with article 14 of the Convention, the prohibition on discrimination. Article 14 does not explicitly refer to sexual orientation, but due to the Court's case law it is now a forbidden discrimination ground. According to the Commission, the Russian Federation fails to deliver any reasonable and objective

arguments as to why propaganda of homosexuality is forbidden whilst propaganda of heterosexuality or sexuality in general is not. The Commission concludes that the anti-propaganda laws are incompatible with articles 10, 11, and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

The Venice Commission is not the only organ of the Council of Europe that clearly states that Russia's new federal law is contrary to European human rights standards. The Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland wrote an open letter to the chairman of the Duma, reminding him that whatever the public opinion in Russia may be, a law that legitimizes prejudice is unacceptable (Jagland, 2013). Both the Committee of Ministers, the highest political organ of the Council, and the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) have issued Recommendations on measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity (Recommendation, 2010). PACE has voiced deep concern regarding the anti-propaganda laws and called for measures against these violations of the freedom of expression and the increase of hate speech and homophobic violence fuelled by the anti-propaganda laws (Recommendation, 2013).

The Council of Europe is primarily an intergovernmental organisation, which means that these opinions and Recommendations are not enforceable. Nonetheless, they are of great value to the advancement of LGBT rights because of their significant moral authority in the member states. When an individual complainer is confronted with a member state with less or no commitment to the protection of human rights, however, opinions and recommendations are insufficient. Only the European Court of Human Rights, "the conscience of Europe" (Council of Europe, 2010), determines the scope of the minimum of human rights protection that a member state is forced to offer an individual complainer.

The European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has come a long way in the protection of LGBT rights: from depicting masculine homosexuality as a specific social danger in 1975 (*X v Germany*) to recognising sexual orientation as a forbidden discrimination ground in 1999 (*Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal*) and demanding its member states to formally recognise the new identity of a post-operative transsexual person in 2002 (*Goodwin v the UK*).

Fortunately, many European countries are exceeding these minimum standards, affording a higher level of protection than is strictly required of the member states. Top-down pressure is after all not the only way to advance LGBT rights, and some scholars even question its effectiveness, as it holds the risk of "linking LGBT rights to external forces threatening national values" (Ayoub, 2014, p. 1). Indeed, depicting LGBT rights as foreign and contrary to traditional Russian values is part of the popular narrative that supports the anti-gay propaganda laws. However, bottom-up and top-down strategies are not mutually exclusive. In the case of the

anti-propaganda laws, for example, the Court must use top-down pressure to further enable activism (bottom-up pressure) in Russia and increase domestic resonance with minority rights issues and the Court's judgements.

Notwithstanding the importance of the many judgements regarding LGBT rights the Court has issued over the years, it is and has been a piecemeal law reform. Multiple provisions of the Convention have not yet (or only recently) been successfully challenged by a member of the LGBT community. The case law on article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life) is, however, prolific. For decades, the Court itself supported the idea that a distinction must be made between the public and the private sphere, contributing to the "reproduction of the closet" (Kavey, 2012; Johnson, 2013). The same reasoning is now echoed in the anti-propaganda laws, urging the Court to commit to the protection of LGBT rights far beyond the scope of article 8.

Two important judgements of the Court, both issued in 2010, will be analysed by way of example. The case of *Alekseyev v Russia* illustrates why the bodies of the Council of Europe are certain the Court will find a violation of the Convention when confronted with the anti-propaganda laws. The Court's stance in *Schalk and Kopf v Austria*, however, suggests that the current minimum standards in human rights protection are not sufficient to protect LGBT people from the harmful effects of these laws.

The case of *Alekseyev v Russia* (2010), the first case concerning LGBT rights in Russia brought before the Court, was a success: the Court withheld a violation of article 11 (freedom of assembly) alone and taken in conjunction with article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and article 13 (right to an effective remedy). It is also the judgement often referred to in the aforementioned opinion of the Venice Commission that leads to the conclusion that the anti-propaganda laws are a violation of the Convention. The case concerns an LGBT rights activist, Nikolay Alekseyev, who tried to organise a Pride March in Moscow but was prevented from doing so by the local authorities for three years in a row. The events were formally banned on the grounds of "public order, for the prevention of riots and the protection of health, morals and the rights and freedom of others" (*Alekseyev v Russia,* 2010, par. 12). Meanwhile, the mayor of Moscow publicly stated that homosexuality was unnatural, and that people who deviated from normal sexual behaviour should not promote their "lifestyle" in public. Contrary to Western countries, the mayor continues, the Russian society is "ill-disposed to such occurrences of life" (*Alekseyev v Russia*, 2010, par. 8). After the third refusal, Nikolay Alekseyev filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights. The Court supports his claim: his right to freedom of assembly was violated when the Russian authorities forbade him to strive for LGBT rights and tolerance towards the LGBT community. There might not be an overall consensus on LGBT rights among the member states, but "conferring substantive rights on homosexual persons is fundamentally different from recognising their right to campaign for such rights" (*Alekseyev v Russia,* 2010, par. 84). In other words, you have to allow people to fight for their rights, not necessarily

grant them. The Court also believes that the reason for refusing the Pride March was based on the sexual orientation of the complainer, therefore withholding a violation of article 14 in conjunction with article 11. It is now certain that refusing activists to organise a Pride March is incompatible with the Convention, but there is more to the anti-propaganda laws. According to the laws, it is forbidden to say that a certain group in society is equal to another: second-class citizenship of the LGBT community is thus embedded in the anti-propaganda laws.

If the Convention is fully inclusive towards LGBT people, then this should translate in every judgement of the Court. However, in the same year as the landmark case *Alekseyev v Russia*, the Court issued a less welcome judgement in the case of *Schalk and Kopf v Austria*. In this case the applicants complained before the Court about the inability for them as a gay couple to marry or to receive an alternative recognition for their relationship. They believed this to be a violation of article 12 (right to marry). The Court, normally endorsing the view that the Convention is a living instrument, now refers to the historical context in which the provisions were written. The right for men and women to marry, therefore, refers to a traditional marriage, a union between partners of a different sex. The Court, however, continues to say that it "would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex" (*Schalk and Kopf*, 2010, par. 61), but to this day, it remains up to the member states to allow or forbid same-sex marriage. In this case, the Court acknowledges that marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations that largely differ from one society to another, which means that national authorities—not the Court—are better placed to respond to the needs of society. This judgement shows how the Court is still giving leeway to notions such as "culture" and "tradition", even if this means causing serious harm to the LGBT community. Finally, the Court does not investigate whether article 12 in conjunction with article 14 is violated, even though the applicants are being treated differently based on their sexual orientation.

Two aspects of this judgement that occur in many other cases on LGBT rights are preventing the Court from granting the LGBT community full protection of the Convention rights. First, we see a problematic usage of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This doctrine teaches us that member states have a certain room for manoeuvring when taking measures to comply with their obligations under the Convention. The Convention rights are after all formulated in a universal and abstract way, while a member state needs to ensure their protection in a national and specific context. In reality, however, the judgements teach us that member states are not only granted a certain amount of freedom in choosing how to ensure the protection of human rights, they are also given a margin of appreciation concerning the interpretation and scope of the convention rights. The scope of the margin of appreciation afforded to individual member states largely depends on the existence or absence of a European consensus on the topic at hand. Even though the Court recently stated that "it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group were

made conditional on its being accepted by the majority" (*Alekseyev v Russia*, 2010, par. 81), the European consensus remains a weighty factor. Some authors plead for a more transparent use of the doctrine, suggesting different criteria to determine the scope of the margin (Kratochvil, 2011; Greer, 2010). Others, such as Judge De Meyer, urge the Court to abandon the doctrine altogether, "because where human rights are concerned there is no room for a margin of appreciation which would enable the states to decide what is acceptable and what is not" (De Meyer, 1998).

The Court is, however, still allowing a potential offender of a human right to dictate what that human right encompasses. This perversion of the margin of appreciation doctrine tarnishes the universality of human rights, allowing for traditions (and non-traditions) to enter the human rights debate. It should be stressed that even with the use of a strict and narrow margin of appreciation, states are still primarily responsible and thus enjoy ample freedom in ensuring how and to what level human rights are protected within their jurisdiction. An individual complainer can appeal to the ECtHR if the absolute minimum standards of human rights protection are (potentially) not met and all domestic remedies are exhausted. Considering that this is the only scenario in which the Court has a voice, I argue that, to avoid being rendered superfluous, this voice should be an emancipated one.

Second, the Court is not consistent in investigating whether a certain law is discriminatory and, therefore, violates article 14 of the Convention. In some cases the Court resolutely condemns discrimination based on sexual orientation, yet in the case of Schalk and Kopf, when discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is obvious, the Court ignored the matter. Recently the Court even proved to be aware of the harmful effects of gender stereotypes, stating that "gender stereotypes cannot, by themselves, be considered to amount to sufficient justification for a difference in treatment, any more than similar stereotypes based on race, origin, colour or sexual orientation" (*Markin v Russia*, 2012, par. 142-143). If the Court were truly committed to recognising and fighting gender stereotypes, however, she would not recently have affirmed her position on same-sex marriage (*Oliari and others v Italy*, 2015). Even though member states now have the positive obligation to provide a general legal framework for same-sex relationships, the Court upholds the stereotype that these relationships are still different, not comparable to heterosexual relationships and, therefore, not worthy of the same recognition and protection.

To this day, the Court fails to send out a strong message in answer to these anti-propaganda laws. The Court will need to be more transparent, consistent, and decisive in her decision-making to secure and advance the minimum standards of LGBT rights protection in the member states. Equality is a concept without margin.

Conclusion

The Russian anti-gay propaganda laws should not be able to survive a future assessment by the European Court of Human Rights. Notwithstanding the progress the

Court has made throughout the years, the present minimum standard of protection is not sufficient to resolutely condemn all forms of highly discriminatory and stigmatizing legislation and must, therefore, be raised. Bearing in mind the aforementioned context, this type of legislation even threatens the very concepts the Court is bound to protect: universal human rights and the principles of democracy.

As a spokesperson of Western values, the Court needs credibility when confronted with anti-propaganda laws. Because of the way the debate on LGBT rights is currently entangled with traditional values in Russia, the Court needs to be extra careful when condemning the laws as a violation of the Convention. If the Court does not appear credible in her commitment to guarantee full protection of the convention for every citizen within her jurisdiction, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity, a future judgement condemning the laws could potentially be seen as a sign of Russophobia, alienating the Russian people from the human rights debate. It appears that the Russian authorities are trying to create a schism with the West, with traditional values on one side and universal human rights including LGBT rights on the other side. The European Court of Human Rights needs to urgently, unambiguously, and irrevocably choose a side in this matter.

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3

Bridging Epidermalization of Black Inferiority and the Racial Epidermal Schema: Internalizing Oppression to the Level of Possibilities

Seunghyun Song

Abstract
In this article, we will engage with Frantz Fanon's two prominent theses of *Black Skin, White Masks*, the epidermalization of inferiority (internalization process of colonial oppression) and racial epidermal schema (bodily embodiment of racial oppression), in order to refine our understanding of race beyond its traditional concepts. We will focus on how race pertains to racialization, which functions through internalization of racial oppression. On this basis, we will investigate how racial oppression influences colonized subjects' possibility of existence, and how the case of French colonialism could help us to unpack current complex issues of black racism.

Keywords
colonialization, black racism, inferiority, oppression

The nominalist notion of race, which explains it as physical dispositions that are hereditarily passed on from one generation to the next, has long lost its scientific validity thanks to critical theory and race studies. Yet race still persists as a category of our perception, as a social currency that divides society into two groups: "us" and "them". In this article, we will engage with Frantz Fanon's two prominent theses of *Black Skin, White Masks* (henceforth, *BSWM*), the epidermalization of inferiority (internalization process of colonial oppression) and racial epidermal schema (bodily embodiment of racial oppression), in order to refine our understanding of race beyond its traditional concepts. We will focus on how race pertains to racialization, which functions through internalization of racial

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oppression. On this basis, we will investigate how racial oppression influences colonized subjects' possibility of existence.

As *BSWM* is a multifaceted piece that criticizes colonialism from multiple perspectives, we will focus on Fanon's phenomenological perspective that grounds the racial epidermal schema, which relates to the epidermalization of inferiority. Our purpose is to relate being in a racially oppressive environment to concrete consequences of being part of a racial minority. By doing so, this article will investigate how identity-based oppression restricts individuals to the extent that their capacity to imagine their identities becomes fixated on an unreachable ideal, i.e. the white, hegemonic masculine subject. We will explore racial oppression through Fanon's thesis on colonial racism, and how it could help us to unpack current complex issues of black racism.

Throughout *BSWM*, Fanon criticizes colonialization through concrete cases such as sexuality, language, and psychosis. He also translates numerous experiences of colonial racism through the phenomenologies of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to explain how colonial racism affects racial minorities. Fanon, who himself was a black man situated in the colonial culture, argues that experiences of racism overshadow his individual subjectivity with "legends, stories, history, and above all *historicity*" of colonialism, which forces him to undergo racialization, thus developing a racial epidermal schema (Fanon, 1986, p. 84, author's emphasis). At the most fundamental level, his corporeal schema racializes into a racial epidermal schema, which—as we will see—is equivalent to being pushed into the position of inferiority. By explaining this process of becoming inferior as the consequence of racial oppression, Fanon notes how black individuals internalize racism and develop different styles of embodiment in comparison to white individuals.

Fanon's phenomenological descriptions can be found in *BSWM*'s fifth chapter, "The Fact of Blackness", an unfortunate translation of the lived experiences of being black. The chapter engages with many instances of racism against people of colour in the colonial period. For instance, racial slurs of "Dirty Nigger!" are hurled at black individuals on the streets, through which Fanon confronts the "white" gaze, in other words, the gaze embedded in the colonial culture that regards black people negatively. This gaze influences Fanon to the extent that his bodily existence is restricted. The "white" gaze transforms Fanon's bodily existence: his body, formerly carefree in his race, transforms into a "Negro's" body through racialization. When a white child cries out "Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!" after setting eyes on Fanon, Fanon comes to embody the different meanings that his race carries in France in comparison to Martinique. While both places are subsumed in colonial culture, the metropolis is dominated by the white norm, propagated by the white majority. In France, Fanon confronts racial meanings that place him in an inferior status *in relation to* white people, altering Fanon's basic modes of existence at the most fundamental level.

The effect of the white gaze, simply put, reduces black individuals' subjectivity to racist representations of colonial ideology. We will investigate what it means

to be reduced in subjectivity by focusing on how a black individual dons herself a white mask in spite of her black skin.

Epidermalization of Inferiority

Fanon's epidermalization of inferiority explains colonialization through the perspective of internalization. Fanon notes how black individuals *become* inferior in concrete cases of everyday living, where black individuals simultaneously suffer from racial hierarchy, while perpetuating it by internalizing the idea of black inferiority. When confronted with racial prejudices, black individuals act in certain ways that render them inferior. In this essay, inferiority denotes relativization, rather than lesser human capacity such as rationale or intellect. In other words, epidermalization of inferiority refers to the process in which people of colour relativize themselves to the white norm.

Fanon handles numerous concrete examples of epidermalization of inferiority, the most pertinent being the case of sexuality. Fanon's acerbic criticism of Mayotte Capécia's *Je suis Martiniquaise* demonstrates Fanon's thesis of epidermalization of inferiority, as well as his perspective on decolonization. Fanon views Mayotte's desire of whiteness as a product of colonial self-misrecognition. Throughout the book, Mayotte reacts to the feeling of insignificance that people of colour face in colonial cultures. She finds her black body as concealing her "white potentials", accentuating the split between how she feels (white) and how she looks (black). This split culminates into her pursuit of a white partner, from whom she seeks confirmation of her "whiteness" and her belongingness to the white world. Her constant "preoccupation with attracting the attention of the white man ... being powerful like the white man ... to seek admittance to the white sanctuary" demonstrates the dependency of the white approval which she embraces in her attempt of self-transcendence (Fanon, 1986, p. 36). Fanon criticizes this dependency as an active embodiment of black inferiority, where black individuals affirm the colonial values by placing themselves in the position of relativity. The structure of dual narcissism that founds the white-black hierarchy in the colonial culture—"the white man is sealed in his whiteness [and] the black man in his blackness" (Fanon, 1986, p. 3)—is fundamentally based on black individuals' embrace of white authority. In their narcissistic pursuit towards self-approval, they place the white individuals in the position of authority, from whom they seek validation. Mayotte's candid desire for a white partner affirms and perpetuates the status of black inferiority by placing herself under the authority of white approval. Paradoxically, Mayotte's self-righteous vindication of her white potentials becomes proof of her status of inferiority, due to the dependency on the white approval.

When Fanon criticizes Mayotte's book and its success as "a sermon in praise of corruption", he points out that such embrace of colonial desires inexorably accepts the hegemony of colonial ideology, rather than striving towards decoloni-

zation (Fanon, 1986, p. 29). Embracing the white values, as Mayotte did, renders black individuals inferior. Moreover, it enforces their position as emulative beings condemned to fail in their aspirations to be white. Mayotte, being black, can never change her race and become white. In the colonial culture, black individuals' acts of self-transcendence are recognized as triumphs of the French colonial project. Even though Mayotte's desire of whiteness is based on her pursuit towards self-validation, her aspirations to be white will never elevate her into higher racial, social, or economic positionality but merely perpetuate her inferiority by conferring authoritative superiority on the ideal of whiteness. Mayotte's desire of whiteness evidences the righteousness of the colonizer's cultural imposition that led black "savages" to a (better) modern civilization. The dominance of ideology debilitates creative ways in which black individuals pursue and affirm their self-worth. In such a milieu, Fanon finds Mayotte's unadulterated expressions of desire acts of corruption that neglect the necessity of decolonization.

A feminist perspective immediately reveals how Fanon, regardless of his intention, dismisses the possibility of a female thinking body in his criticism of Mayotte's work. Fanon's interpretation of Mayotte omits to mention how women of colour experience oppression as intersections of misogyny and racism, which produce fundamentally different forms of self-realization and decolonization. For instance, Fanon does not account for the fact that Mayotte's narration critically engages with the status quo, supported by her self-analysis of desire. It does not occur to Fanon that Mayotte could be motivated to analyse colonial desire. Although she remains silent on the precise means of decolonization, Mayotte provides a critical description of women's situation in the colonial period. For Fanon, however, Mayotte is driven by "a motivation whose elements are difficult to detect" (1986, p. 29). This is indeed a symbolic matricide, a dismissal of Mayotte's status as a female thinker, as pointed out by bell hooks' rejoinder to *BSWM* and *The Wretched of the Earth* (hooks, 1990). Despite the fact that Fanon's later works (e.g. *A Dying Colonialism* and *Toward the African Revolution*) offer more pro-feminist accounts of women's liberation and the activities of feminine bodies, *BSWM* demonstrates why Fanon has an ambivalent relation to feminism and gender theory. However, Fanon's critique on Mayotte still leaves open the question as to how the system of oppression can be overthrown. Fanon argues that if black individuals are treated as inferiors, then the dominance of colonial ideology should be opposed without further propagation of the status quo. For Fanon, only revolution will secure the creative ways in which black individuals self-validate and become truly competent.

What Fanon shows through his thesis of epidermalization of inferiority in the case of sexuality is the relevance of contextual analysis, especially when it comes to societal oppression. He shows how colonialism restricts black individuals' possibilities of existence. Now, we will see that his thesis of epidermalization of inferiority parallels his notion of racial epidermal schema, as both describe the colonial restrictions of black individuals' possibilities. More precisely, both hinder the black individual's projection of possibilities for the future. Epidermalization hinders the

intelligibility of black bodies, while the racial epidermal schema hinders the body's development. Experiences of racism repeatedly compel black individuals to internalize the burden of being black; they are reduced to facile and homogeneous representations of the black "race" and allocated a social position as inferiors who evoke hatred and fear (Lennon, 2015, p. 130). By linking the racial epidermal schema with the epidermalization of inferiority, we reduce the problem of racism to the body as the locus of our being-in-the-world.

The Lived Experience of Being Black: The Structures of the Perceptual Field

The thrust of Fanon's critique of colonialism is a discomforting aspect of race: as much as other objects of perception, race is perceived with qualities that connote particular significances in social and individual registers. In a racist milieu, these qualities are decisively negative. In the same way as we perceive a contorted mouth and knitted eyebrows as a facial expression of anger, we also perceive dark skin tones as uneducated, lower class, or prone to criminality. The difference between perceiving facial expressions and race is that perception of the latter is neither as pragmatic nor benign as the former. We perceive dark faces with qualities that often restrict, if not stigmatize, people of colour.

In phenomenological terms, we perceive on the basis of schemas and images that structure and organize our perceptual field. When we see a person of colour, we perceive him or her through perceptual schemas that tacitly provide us with norms. These norms inform us on how bodies of different races should inhabit space and how we should perceive their bodily existences. In the colonial period, the perceptual field was loaded with colonial ideologies that restricted people of colour. Now, we will take a look at each structure that defines racial qualities in our perceptual field.

Corporeal Schema

In his treatment of the corporeal schema, Fanon reveals his embrace of phenomenological tradition. Fanon defends the division between reflexive and pre-reflexive consciousness on the basis of which the self arises. Moreover, he presents the relation between the body and the world in a way that is similar to Merleau-Ponty's treatment of the body:

> In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. [...] I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to reach out my right arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. [...] all these movements are made not out of habit but

> out of implicit knowledge. A slow composition of my *self* as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal world—which seems to be schema. It does not impose itself on me; it is, rather, a definitive structuring of the self and of the world—definitive because it creates a real dialectic between my body and the world (Fanon, 1986, p. 83, author's italics).

The bodily schema is treated as the ground where consciousness' temporal and spatial compositions take place. In the time that consciousness unites lived experiences of the just-past with projections of the future, the self arises on the basis of retentions and protentions of time consciousness, which synthesize—or, as Fanon terms, compose—different adumbrations of consciousnesses into a unified perception and a self. Here, Fanon embraces fundamental structures of phenomenology: consciousness is consciousness *of* a transcendental object, while every consciousness *of* something has "implicit knowledge" of self-awareness by being conscious *of* consciousness. It is through reflection that consciousness forms the egological structure: pre-reflexive, spontaneous consciousness transforms through reflection where different consciousnesses are synthesized into an egological unity with a past, present, and future continuum of the self. What is important is that the self is the basis through which we perceive the world with coherence, where one finds one's array of possibilities.

The coporeal schema structures and organizes these possibilities which arise in the body's relation to the world. The coporeal schema is the development of habitual comportments and motility, through which a body is a body fully at home, comfortably oriented towards the world in unified patterns of movement that are cultivated in relation to that world. It is on this basis that Fanon can spontaneously reach out for his cigarettes without having to assess every movement of his arm and torso. As corporeal schemas enable our spontaneous movements in pre-reflexive consciousness, disruption of the corporeal schema will hinder individuals' basic human possibilities. As demonstrated by the Schneider case in Merleau-Ponty, disruption of corporeal schema will hinder intelligible movements that the habitual body exhibits (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). It is crucial that the corporeal schema acts as a framework of daily, mundane bodily possibilities. Moreover, Fanon accentuates that the corporeal schema is created out of volition, a view also embraced by Merleau-Ponty. It relates to bodily possibilities that are not "imposed" on the body, but rather created through the reciprocal relation between the body and the world. We are free to activate our bodily possibilities that exceed the framework of our bodily schema, despite the habitual stylization that the schema provides. The body is not something that exists in the world, positioned amidst the world. Rather, the body *relates* to the world by navigating through the world in its interaction with structures of meaning, through which a new structure of coherence is *created*. It discovers the historical world by tuning itself to specific aspects of the world, to which we react with a certain amount of agency. We have the capacity to either affirm or interpret the historical world. When we encounter a situation that provides us with specific possibilities of "I can", we are capable of abiding,

modifying, contesting, or creatively reproducing the discovered structures of meaning through our volitional yet reciprocal acts.

Racial Epidermal Schema

What Fanon adds to phenomenological tradition through his philosophy is to shed light on the disparity between the body and the world through the case of colonialism. Colonial racism disrupts the corporeal schema, which Fanon refers to as his initial mode of existence, when he confronts how others perceive his body as the "Negro's". His corporeal schema transforms into a racial epidermal schema. Through this racial epidermal schema, Fanon becomes confined to the mode of objecthood, where denigrating colonial racial meanings pervade the perceptual field:

> I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slaveships, and above all else, above all: "Sho' good eatin" (Fanon, 1986, pp. 84–5).

To understand what the racial epidermal schema involves, we can refer to a lucid description of a black man's bodily movements when in the presence of a white woman, provided by Cynthia R. Nielson:

> The white man is free to adjust his bodily attunement in order to hear the white woman, whereas the black man is not. What should be an ordinary, noncognitive bodily adjustment becomes for the black man a movement that must be scrutinized from as many perspectives as possible, lest the "wrong" move cost him his life. Such an asymmetrical restriction of the black man's freedom to make bodily adjustments of this sort prevents him from developing a personal "style" which would enable him to emerge and differentiate himself from the phenomenal field in which he finds himself (2013, p. 80).

For instance, we perceive a black man as a threatening "biological" body (which we will discuss further below), informed by racist historicity. This means that a black man, in return, will internalize such perceptions by steering clear of any "unacceptable" bodily movements. The awareness of negative racial perceptions will lead him to develop a specific style of movement: a black man will not approach or lean in, that is, physically approach a white woman to indicate that he could not hear her, while a white man would. The racial difference in bodily stylization attests to the influence of racial perceptions; how racial meanings become ingrained in

people of colour at the level of pre-reflexive consciousness to the extent that their spontaneous movements are self-audited to react to racial meanings.

The racist environment ultimately inhibits black individuals in their corporeality. This statement is the thrust of Fanon's racial epidermal schema, where racial meanings function in relation to specific social positionalities, that is, being black becomes indicative of one's inferior social, economic, political, and even geographical status. These "indications" restrict people of colour. Because black men are perceived to be prone to criminality, violence, and wrongdoing, they may exert their bodily existence in abidance to the racist norms. What is more is that the stylization of racialized bodies self-audit their bodily existences *in anticipation of* the punitive norms, so that the "white" standards become ingrained as a panoptic presence in the black individual's consciousness. This solidifies the power of racial oppression by means of internalization. In other words, the racial bodily schema as a product of racial oppression becomes internalized by black individuals through the very means of their embodiment.

Body Images

In Fanon's description of colonial racism, we find that racial qualities are structured not only through schemas but also through images. While the perceptual field is informed by the schema, through which we holistically perceive coloured bodily existences, the perceptual field is anchored on racialized body images of people of colour. In his discussion of colonial psychosis, Fanon explains how being black is perceived as the symbol of the "biological". Black individuals are viewed as "biological", that is, closer to nature, savage-like, immoderate, and as having unrepressed desires equivalent to the drives of the Freudian life instinct. In other words, all the desires that should be repressed in accordance to (white) social standards are projected on black individuals, which shapes the perception of black individuals "as if the Negro really had them" (Fanon, 1986, p. 127).

In particular, black masculinity suffers from the qualities of exaggerated sexual potency, where black men are regarded as instinctual, dangerous, and violent. It is also this sexual exaggeration that cancels out black men's intellect: "An erection on Rodin's thinker is a shocking thought" (Fanon, 1986, p. 127). Subsequently, black masculinity is castrated: the virility and manhood of black men are tabooed by colonial norms. Put differently, black masculinity is contorted and oppressed, as it is unacceptable that the black male body signifies a phallus that exceeds that of a white man: "the Negro is castrated. The penis, the symbol of manhood, is annihilated, which is to say that it is denied . . . it is in his corporeality that the Negro is attacked. It is as an actual being that he is a threat . . . by the fear of the sexual potency of the Negro" (Fanon, 1986, pp. 125–6). In other words, we perceive black men as "biological", which in turn enforces the social taboo of their sexuality. It is also on this perceptual basis that an ideal of the black male slave is cultivated, e.g. as portrayed in the ex-

ample of "Y'a bon banania", a racist image of a good-natured simpleton who smiles widely in naïve, innocuous servitude, even when tending to his Madame's nylons.

This symbol is one of many schemas and images that constitute the racial qualities of our perceptual field. We perceive countless racial qualities, shaping our perception of people of colour. Racial qualities pervade our perception, bodily existence, and usage of language, which all structure the experience of being black. Entrenched in such structures of racial intelligibility, the child attests its immediacy by conveying intense reactions when seeing Fanon. As a naïve, unknowing child sees racial qualities and affirms them, so we are influenced by its immediacy as the racial qualities flood our perceptual fields spontaneously. Moreover, people of colour are influenced by these racial qualities: the ways in which they are perceived by the others shape their experiences of being black. In other words, the detrimental qualities that we see so spontaneously in our quotidian perception change the ways in which black individuals must live as the objects of perception.

The reductive function of racial qualities has a strong influence on black individuals in colonial milieus. These negative race perceptions turn people of colour into inferiors; a racial hierarchy of colonization is affirmed and perpetuated. White and black individuals form a racial power imbalance, attested by Fanon's confrontation with the child's frightened cry. Merely through the child's gaze, Fanon is pushed into a state where he is rejected in the basic capacity of human consciousness to oscillate between two modes of being: being-for-itself and being-for-others. The confrontation with the "white" gaze, in other words, renders Fanon's own body alien to himself, where he finds himself incapable of reapprehending, that is, reasserting his body and endorsing his being-for-itself that will replace the child's gaze and its colonial objectification. In colonial culture, individuals' bodily existences are perceived with specific intelligibility, which, in the case of black individuals, petrifies their bodies into the imageries of colonial historicity. This historicity comes with an insuperability, which immobilizes Fanon from reapprehending his own body in confrontation with the other's gaze. Whereas white individuals enjoy the privilege of accessing their body through unmediated self-awareness, black bodies become mediated by the structures of racial meanings.

"I can" and "I can, insofar I am white"

The problem of colonial asymmetry—the disparity between one's experiences and the other's perceptions thereof, and the disparity among different races in stylizing their bodies—becomes clearer when we understand how such restrictions hinder an individual's existence as a whole. In order to illustrate this, we can address Fanon's treatment of racial meanings and their temporality. Racial meanings come with historicity. While not developed in detail, multiple examples in *BSWM* elucidate how racial meanings never arise in a vacuum. Racial meanings of the present continue those of the past and are projected onto the future. When we perceive

race on the basis of corporeal schema and body images, we take up its temporal dimension, where present meanings connect to the past's and the future's. Both racial epidermal schema and epidermalization of inferiority pinpoint the limited existence of black individuals, through which it is fruitful to note how oppression takes its toll in one's broader existence.

For instance, by pointing out the "biological" image of black men's bodies, Fanon exposes the sedimentation of the colonial past that propagated this racial image. We may regard this as historicity of racial oppression, which is not so much a set of genealogical explanations of current racism as the structural synthesis of racial meanings. The present racial meanings arise from the lived past and are projected onto the future. Our perception is structured through sedimentation, which exceeds the scope of the here-and-now into the past and the future. In this sense, a lived experience of the just past can be used as an exemplar of the long past, affirming the significance of Fanon's phenomenological analysis of a lived experience as attesting to the broader history of colonial culture. Fanon intuits the dire consequences of a racist milieu, where oppression does not only refer to the present. Mundane, daily perceptions of race, as sedimentation and historicity of colonialism, have a temporal impact. Black individuals who confront colonial historicity recognize its insuperability by intuiting their inhibited potentialities as already *has been* and internalize and perpetuate the historicity as what *will be*. Then we understand that minorities never simply experience racial discrimination in an atemporal sense; being discriminated against is always a process in which one's future becomes inhibited by past "sedimented" experiences. As a result, we can anticipate the consequences of the racist perceptual field, that is, the functions of racial epidermal schema and colonial body images.

To understand an aspect of the racial epidermal schema and its consequences for racial minorities, we will specifically handle people of colour's projection of possibilities, which base itself on the present. In other words, we can complement the thrust of *BSWM* by investigating black individuals' intentionality of "I can" and how it would be hindered in a colonial context. Here, I embrace the thrust of feminist commentaries on gender embodiment, a pivotal figure being Iris Marion Young: oppression becomes internalized by minorities at the level of embodiment, through which their fundamental scope of being becomes restricted in comparison to their dominant counterparts (Young, 1980). Oppression does not only restrict on the basis of structural disadvantages or unequal opportunities, but also force the minorities to internalize the norm to their bodily existence. We can see that internalization of colonial black inferiority results in self-auditing consciousness. On this basis, we can argue that internalized oppression will format the projection of "I can" in an inhibited form. For instance, "I can" becomes influenced by racial schemas and images that contextualize the projection. That is, a woman of colour's projection of "I can" becomes contextualized into "I can, insofar as I am white". Or, faced with intersections of discrimination of gender and race, her projection of "I can" is followed by a clause of "I can, insofar as I am like the white man". In this case,

the possibility of "I can" is accompanied by "insofar as I can be like a white man" which posits a white, masculine ideal. This contextualization can be explained by a function of the imagination, where the projection of the "*I*" becomes uncanny due to the alien body-image that does not match that of the black person's. In other words, imagination can function as one of the mechanisms that inhibit one's projection of possibilities, by orchestrating a normative projection that is fundamentally alien to one's own gendered and racialized body. This is paramount in Fanon's work: black individuals' imagination becomes colonized. The imagination adjusts itself to the paradigm of emulation. The ideal that is assumed is a white body's that contrasts with the real body that projects.

We can refer to the imagining consciousness to explain how colonial white norms infiltrate the projections of people of colour. Imagination allows the pseudo-perception of the absent (Sartre, 2004): the imagining consciousness combines the perception of "I can" with the projection of "I can insofar as". Imagination, in other words, fixates the black individual's projections onto the white ideal, similar to Bonnie Mann's analysis which reveals women's imagination to be the realm of heteronormativity (2009). The ideal, in turn, is always embodied by a hegemonic white masculinity, which alienates black individuals from their own projections of possibilities. As imagination fixates upon the white ideal, black individuals realize and perpetuate the ideology of white humanity and black inferiority to the most intimate levels of existence. It is in the spontaneous projections of possibility that black individuals' imagination comes into play, so that acts of transcendence become disrupted by colonial ideology. This is how black individuals sediment colonial ideology of black inferiority by embodying their corporeality in accordance with the interference of the colonial ideal. To return to the starting point that motivated Fanon to such reflections, daily experiences of racism function as unsettling reminders that one's existence so far has been shaped by preceding sedimentation of racist values, and will be shaped by these values by projecting one's possibilities on the very same basis. In other words, while the internalized norm is nothing more than an imaginary, it serves as a pressing conscience that defines the very mode of being of a racialized individual in a racist milieu.

Conclusion

In this article, we discussed Fanon's epidermalization of inferiority and the racial epidermal schema. We can thus anticipate the problem of these two products of colonialization by theorizing their influence on black individuals' possibilities of existence, that is, the inhibition of their existence.

We can suggest a possible application of our discussion by way of conclusion. Our discussion of the effect of colonial oppression on people of colour can help us understand the issues of identity-based discrimination in contemporary society. More specifically, Fanon's phenomenological description of colonial racism provides us with important insights that help us in further grasping the complex issues

of concrete racism that black individuals face in white-dominant cultures and environments. For instance, we can apply our understanding of colonial racial oppression to the contemporary racism that women of colour face in professional fields. Due to intersecting aspects of identity, women of colour will experience similar, yet fundamentally different oppressive schemas to men of colour, as proven by the thrust of intersectionality (e.g. Crenshaw, 1994). Women of colour are perceived with specific qualities of race and gender. On the basis of these qualities, their acts of self-transcendence will be perceived in ways that restrict their creative possibilities of existence. Moreover, since women of colour are perceived through different images, norms, and qualities of both gender and race, their development of bodily schemas will embody and internalize specific images that are different from those of black men during the colonial period in the 1940s when Fanon was experiencing racism. The specificity of women of colour's bodily schemas, which arises from the specificity of perceptive qualities that limit their intentions and capacities, will develop as they internalize discrimination in such a way that their possibilities of existence are limited by both racial and sexist oppressions.

For example, when women of colour enter an organizational culture in professional fields, they are usually required to act according to professional norms, which are defined through hegemonic white masculinity. Often these women adapt to these norms. However, they are still perceived as those who do not fit into the role of professionals, especially as professionals who rank high in the hierarchy. Even when women of colour act in ways demanded by the masculine work culture—aggressive, self-assertive, dominant, etc. —they are rejected on the basis of their "artificial" identity that betrays their gender and racial identity. The betrayal of femininity, or ethnicity, often leads to disproportionate criticisms; women of colour are often regarded as "too" aggressive, "too" dominant, or "too" reserved, thus, not satisfying the normative demands and expectations, but rather parading fake identities. These kinds of evaluations devaluate their capacities or potentials as "good workers", hence, marginalizing them from further achievements within professional settings. Glass ceilings and bamboo ceilings bar women of colour from belonging to the field, by treating their identity as a mismatch for the profession. In such cases, women of colour are perceived as having certain qualities that do not match with the ideal of the professional. Moreover, when women of colour join the job market, they internalize the perceived qualities by projecting self-audited possibilities of "I can …, insofar as I act like a white male". The result of internalization is detrimental: these projections only accentuate the fact that women of colour enact inauthenticity. This play of inauthenticity is strongly reminiscent of the logic of colonialism: by inducing the paradigm of emulation, a black individual was demanded to be white, only to be perceived as a black man who has donned himself a white mask. This inspiration to "become white" becomes proof of people of colour's position of relativity, which Fanon specifies as the position of inferiority.

We can surmise that women of colour's internalization of discrimination will function in a manner that is comparable to, yet also different from, that of men of

colour. Moreover, further research needs to be done on the complex negotiation between the resistance of the oppressed and the power of oppression. This article paid attention to the descriptive power that phenomenology can provide to reach deeper and more impactful understandings of oppressive processes and their consequences. We aimed to describe the gravity of racial and gender discrimination by providing a detailed analysis of how oppression functions at the level of bodily consciousness. This is not to downplay the agency that any oppressed individual may possess. Instead, we suggest that investigating Fanon's phenomenological descriptions of colonial racism can offer us insights into racial oppression; it can further advance our understandings of complex issues of black racism that hinder the possibilities of minorities in numerous domains of everyday living.

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4

Diasporic Muslims, Mental Health, and Subjectivity: Perspectives and Experiences of Mental Health Care Professionals in Ghent

Elise Rondelez, Sarah Bracke, Griet Roets, Caroline Vandekinderen, and Piet Bracke

Abstract

The mental health of Muslims with a migration background in Belgium seems to be particularly at risk. Inspired by the work of Nikolas Rose on the question of subjectivity, our sociological research analyses processes of subjectification that occur within existing mental health services, and the subsequent "proper" subject of mental health that is created along the way. We focus on how mental health care professionals approach and construct diasporic Muslims in Ghent, a middle-sized city in the north of Belgium. The article consists of three sections. We first lay out how our study is grounded in the work of Rose and his attention to subjectivity. The second section presents our methodology, and the empirical material that grounds our analysis. In the third section, we apply Rose's approach to subjectivity to our empirical data. Our study challenged us to illustrate and discuss different aspects of the subjectivity dimension as explained by Rose, and to enlarge our analytical approach and identify a logic of cultural difference by relying on the work of Edward Said. We come to the conclusion that the work of Rose and Said allows a critical deconstruction of this binary dialectic between ontologically different categories of Self and Other, yet does not enable us to go beyond a negative appreciation of professionals in mental health care and to (re-)imagine a non-deterministic and non-dualistic framing of the human subject formation of diasporic Muslims.

Keywords

mental health (care), Muslim migrants, Rose, qualitative interviews, subjectivity

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The mental health of Muslims with a migration background in Belgium seems to be particularly at risk (Buytaert, Vandedrink, & Lemmens, 2009; Colaço Belmonte, 1976; Hilderink, Van 't Land, & Smits, 2009; Hoffer, 2009; Inhorn & Serour, 2011), as a result of intersecting power relations that shape the position of many diasporic Muslims in Belgium.[1] Diasporic Muslims are considered ethnic-religious minorities, who are positioned in particular intersections with class and gender relations (see Rondelez, Bracke, Roets, & Bracke, 2016), and who are systematically confronted with the racism and social exclusion that characterise Belgian society and that potentially impact their mental health. As studies in the United States and Europe show, racism and social exclusion can result in mental health problems (Brown, 2003; Chakraborty, Mckenzie, Hajat, & Stansfeld, 2010; Karlsen, Nazroo, Mckenzie, Bhui, & Weich, 2005). Diasporic Muslims are nevertheless largely underrepresented in or even absent from mental health care institutions in Belgium (Doornbos, Zandee, Degroot, & Warpinski, 2013; ZorgnetVlaanderen, 2011).

This leaves us with somewhat of a conundrum, which we have started to explore and unpack from the perspective of the question of subjectivity (Rondelez et al., 2016). This approach is inspired by the work of Nikolas Rose (1998, 1999), and his study of the ways in which the self has been shaped by prevailing ways of thinking. Rose has extensively examined the regimes of knowledge whereby individuals have come to identify themselves as certain beings, the regulations and tactics that are interconnected with these knowledge regimes, and the relationships that individuals have developed with themselves in considering themselves as subjects. Rose's work is particularly relevant for our study as he further elaborates a Foucaultian approach to subjectivity within a sociological framework, that includes empirical research. Moreover, he specifically attends to the role of the psy-disciplines (psychology, psychotherapy, and psychiatry) in the construction of the modern self.

It goes without saying that the question of underrepresentation can be approached in a variety of ways. It might be considered from the perspective of the material and cultural factors that render access to health care more difficult for ethnic-religious minorities, or from the perspective of existing mental health practices within ethnic-religious minority groups that reduce the need of minorities to rely on the established mental health services. More concretely, the focus might be on epidemiological data (Kluge, Bogic, Deville, Greacen, Dauvrin, Dias, Gaddini, Koitzsch Jensen, Ioannidi-Kapolou, Mertaniemi, Pucipinos, Riera, Sandhu, Saravry, Soares, Stankunas, Straβmayr, Weibel, Heinz, & Priebe, 2012; Lodewyckx, Janssens, Ysabie, & Timmerman, 2005), the unequal distribution of mental health

1 The concept of "diaspora" is used as an analytical interpretive frame for the cultural, economic, and political ways of historical particular "genealogies" of migrancy and for the examination of the relations between different migrancies across fields of social relations, subjectivity, and identity. What regimes of power inscribe the formation of a specific diaspora? The concept of "diaspora" also critiques discourses of fixed origins, because not every diaspora goes with an ideology of return. Diasporas often exist out of different journeys to different parts of the world, each with their own history and particularities. The notion of "diaspora" focuses on formations of power which distinguish diasporas internally as well as situate them in relation to each other. These different migrancies can come together in one journey through the convergence of narratives that are individually as well as collectively (re-)lived, (re-)produced, remembered, and transformed. By consequence, the identity of the diasporic imagined community is not pre-given (Brah, 1996).

problems (Aichberger, Bromand, Heredia Montesinos, Temur-Erman, Mundt, Heinz, Rapp, & Schouler-Ocak, 2012; Kleinman, 2012; Siller, Renner, & Juen, 2015; Vardar, Kluge, & Penka, 2012), institutional dynamics and implicit biases (Heinz & Kluge, 2012; Kluge et al., 2012; Rechel, Mladovsky, Ingleby, Mackenbach, & Mckee, 2013; Vardar et al., 2012) or the socio-culturally constructed character of mental health problems (Bäärnhielm & Mösko, 2012; Crammond & Carey, 2016; Heinz & Kluge, 2012; Kapilashrami, Hill, & Meer, 2015; Kluge et al., 2012; Vardar et al., 2012). A focus on subjectivity offers another kind of contribution to this discussion. It enables us to trace processes of subjectification that occur within existing mental health services, and the subsequent "proper" subject of mental health that is created along the way. The "proper" subject of the established mental health services might indeed be shaped in such a way that renders both the access of diasporic Muslims and their trajectory through established mental health services more difficult. This is indeed a central assumption of our study, which offers additional insight into the understudied interactions between mental health care professionals and diasporic Muslims (Buytaert et al., 2009; Hilderink et al., 2009; Hoffer, 2009; Inhorn & Serour, 2011).

This article is part of a larger study, in which we consider different aspects of the processes of subjectification that are involved in those interactions. Here we focus on mental health care professionals, and how they perceive their work with Muslims with a migration background. More precisely, we ask: how do mental health care workers in Ghent, a middle-sized city in Belgium, approach and construct diasporic Muslims as subjects and service users of mental health care? The article consists of three sections. We first lay out how our study is grounded in the work of Rose and his attention to subjectivity. The second section presents our methodology and the empirical material that grounds our analysis. In the third section, we apply Rose's approach to subjectivity to our empirical data.

The Subject of Mental Health

Rose's sociological interest in subjectivity builds on the Foucaultian insight that "the ethics of subjectivity are inextricably locked into the procedures of power" (Rose, 1998, pp. 78-79). Modern power, Foucault famously argued, does not function by repression and domination alone, but is productive: it actively produces certain subjects, shapes psyches, and fabricates persons with certain desires (Rose, 1998). This shaping of the subject occurs through particular discourses, which should be considered in their particularity. The critical impulse propelling Rose's analysis can be summarized as follows: "Where, how, and by whom are aspects of the human being rendered problematic, according to what systems of judgment and in relation to what concerns?" (Rose, 1998, pp. 25-26). This critical impulse, moreover, leads him to examine those regimes of knowledge and expertise that are focused on the subject's psychology and mental health: the psy-disciplines.

In *Governing the Soul* (1999 [1989]) and *Inventing Ourselves* (1998), Rose offers an account of the rise of psychology in modern society. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Rose argues, the development of psychological intellectual and practical technologies is related to developments in the political structures in present-day European and North-American liberal democracies, and to changes in prevailing conceptions of personhood (Rose, 1998). More precisely, the regulatory component of psychology, i.e. the way in which humans regulate others and themselves, is connected, according to Rose, to the (re)organization of political powers and government.[2] Psychology, in other words, is particularly well-suited for the administration and social control that modern governmentality requires (Rose, 1998).

The work of Rose demonstrates how the exercise of modern political power has become fundamentally connected to the knowledge of human subjectivity (Rose, 1998). As Rose asserts, "to address the relations between subjectivity, psychology, and society from this perspective is to examine those fields in which the conduct of the self and its powers have been linked to ethics and morality, to politics and administration, and to truth and knowledge" (1998, pp. 48-49). Advanced liberal democratic states, in sum, are confronted with some particular problems to which psy-disciplines propose solutions—an alignment that, at least partly, resides in a shared individualism (Rose, 1998). More specifically, modern democratic rule can be considered as a government through freedom, choices, and solidarities. In a liberal democracy, humans are understood as individual, autonomous selves with self-responsibility and choice, equipped with a psychology aspiring to self-fulfilment, running their lives as enterprises (Rose, 1998). This implies, first, that democratic government requires an extensive knowledge about its subjects, and second, that its rule is partly indirect. The psy-disciplines help to chart the terrain of the subject's choices and their rationale, which enables subsequent governmental interventions. Take, for instance, the domain of health: the health of its subjects is vital to the national successes of the democratic state, which equally constructs and affirms many health-related decisions as "private" and individual choices. The most efficient way to govern such "private" domains, Rose insists, is through autonomy and responsibility (Rose, 1998).

Besides Rose's detailed discussion of the rise and significance of the psy-disciplines in relation to established democratic rule, he also draws attention to new forms of government as they developed in the post-welfare states in the West at the end of the twentieth century. These forms of government, which we can call neoliberal, depend even more on the properties of their subjects, to the extent that it would be impossible to understand them without incorporating a new understanding and enacting of ourselves and others as "free and choosing" selves (Rose, 1998). In the context of the emergence of such neoliberal forms of governmental-

2 Following Foucault, government is to be understood in a broad sense as "all those more or less rationalized programs, strategies, and tactics for 'the conduct of conduct', for acting upon the actions of others in order to achieve certain ends" (Rose, 1998, pp. 11-12). Government, for Rose (1998, p. 29), thus refers to a "certain perspective from which one might make intelligible the diversity of attempts by authorities of different sorts to act upon the actions of others in relation to objectives", such as, notably, health.

ity, we are particularly interested in the recovery paradigm, which scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in the last decades have considered as a promising framework for mental health care services, both internationally and in Belgium (see Deegan, 2003; Slade, 2012). In recovery-oriented practice, an attempt is made to "reach beyond our storehouse of writings that describe psychiatric disorder as a catastrophic life event" (Ridgeway, 2001, p. 335), and priority is given to embracing strengths rather than weaknesses, hope rather than despair, and engagement and active participation in life rather than withdrawal and isolation (Secker, Membrey, Grove, & Seebohm, 2002; Leamy, Bird, Le Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011). We argue, however, that it is necessary to theorize underlying notions of the human subject when studying how service users are approached in recovery-oriented mental health care (see Vandekinderen, Roets, Roose, & Van Hove, 2012). When people with mental health problems are expected to become self-responsible citizens, the responsibility for leading a fulfilling life is individualized (Craig, 2008). As Vandekinderen et al. (2012, p. 3) argue, it becomes particularly tricky and even impossible to provide high-quality mental health care "when this ideology of individual choice and opportunity denies the fact that some citizens have few available choices and resources". Unsurprisingly, the recovery paradigm has been critiqued, with an increasing number of authors arguing for a truly social approach to recovery, in which people with mental health problems and professionals have an alliance and share responsibility in shaping care and support practices in a continuous dialogue (Beresford & Croft, 2004; Vandekinderen et al., 2012).

Mental Health Care Professionals in Ghent

Our exploration of the question of subjectivity in the realm of mental health services and ethnic-religious minorities focuses on how mental health care workers approach and construct these minorities as subjects and service users. Our empirical case study is situated in Belgium, where the conundrum that we alluded to in the introduction remains unaccounted for.[3] Most Muslims in Belgium are of Turkish and Moroccan descent, which is the result of labour migration, structured by bi-lateral agreements between Belgium and Turkey and between Belgium and Morocco in the 1960s, and subsequent family reunions and marriages (Fadil, Asri, & Bracke, 2015). By "diasporic Muslims" we understand those Muslims with a migration experience in their own life, or in the lives of their (grand)parents. Turks and Moroccans are the largest groups of migrants in Belgium and they have a particular work-related or

3 There have been studies in other national contexts that offer some insights into the conundrum. A Dutch study shows that ethnic minority groups have more police referrals, crisis contacts, and compulsory admissions (see de Wit, Tuinebreijer, Van Brussel, & Selten, 2012; Fassaert, Heijnen, de Wit, Peen, Beekman, & Dekker, 2016). In the United States studies show that diasporic migrants have more trouble accessing (mental) health care (Tabb, Larrison, Choi, & Huang, 2016) for a variety of reasons such as discomfort to talk to someone about personal problems, fear that someone would find out, trouble to get an appointment, a desire to solve their problems on their own, bad experiences with treatment, different conceptions of the nature, causes or cure of mental illnesses, and language difficulties (see Cai & Robst, 2016; Leong & Kalibatseva, 2011; Sorkin, Murphy, Nguyen, & Biegler, 2016).

family-related migration history. This motivates our choice to begin this preliminary research with those groups. An additional reason why we focus on these particular groups is that, as Muslims, they are, according to Said (2005), considered the Other. Mental health professionals, who are often not diasporic Muslims, might be expected to make a distinction between "us" and "them", thus influencing mental health care. In the city of Ghent, where our case study is situated, most Muslims with a migration background are of Turkish and, to a lesser extent, Moroccan descent. A first analysis of our data shows that Muslims of Turkish descent more often go to counsellors than those of Moroccan descent, but it is not clear why.

We set up a qualitative interpretative study and engaged with local network analysis (Turrini, Christofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2009). This allowed us to make a "cartography"[4] of social problem constructions in the field of mental health care in Ghent. We selected and recruited 24 local actors in mental health care in Ghent, such as socio-cultural workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, therapists, community (health) professionals, welfare professionals, nurses, and general practitioners, based on their experience with diasporic Muslims with mental health problems or the expectation that they would be able to formulate a well-founded opinion about the possible issues in this field. We began by contacting local actors who were related to a few umbrella organizations. We then dug deeper in the field of mental health care organizations. Following a snowball sampling strategy (Esterberg, 2002), all respondents were asked if they knew other interesting contacts for our study. Biomedical professionals ended up being underrepresented in our sample, as many of them responded to our request to participate by pointing out that they did not have enough Muslims in their institutions to be of interest to the study. This seems to indicate that diasporic Muslims are most underrepresented on the institutional and biomedical side of the spectrum of mental health care. It also implies that biomedical views are underrepresented in our analysis. On the other hand, community care centres and system therapists are overrepresented. This can explain the focus on culturally sensitive ways of treating patients and the dominance of the family in the conducted interviews. Snowball sampling runs the risk of taking respondents out of the same pool of respondents, which can result in too much similarity between respondents. Both factors influenced the results of the analysis.

We used qualitative, semi-structured interviews to explore the personal meanings that our respondents gave to their experiences with diasporic Muslims. The interviews were semi-structured to allow the respondents enough space to articulate their own insights. The duration of the interviews varied from 45 minutes to slightly over 2 hours. All interviews were recorded with a voice recorder and fully transcribed.

We subsequently sought to relate our data to the theory of Rose and Rose's theory to our data. Instead of focusing on a specific theoretical framework or theorist,

4 We decided to call this a "cartography" because of two important characteristics. The first one is that it is politically normative: selecting is also always appreciating. The second one has to do with its link with subjectivity, our main focus of research (Braidotti, 2002).

Jackson and Mazzei (2012) argue that researchers can rely on particular concepts, which are part of an assemblage of "texts" that constitute one another and create something new. As such, analytical questions become possible by referring to, and hence activating, a specific theoretical concept. Although Rose (1999, p. xi) is reluctant to turn his Foucaultian commitment to studying power, knowledge, and the subject into a formal methodology, he does discern four dimensions in an analysis focused on subjectivity: an ontological, epistemological, ethical, and technical dimension.

Shedding Light on Emerging Insights

We now turn to our empirical material, and analyse and discuss the narratives of mental health care practitioners through the lens of these four aspects.

1. Ontological Aspects

The first aspect Rose discerns when it comes to subjectivity is the ontological one, that is, the views on the nature of being of subjects, in this case diasporic Muslims with mental health issues. Here we found that, most of the time, our respondents considered the subjects to be lacking knowledge about themselves. Many expert professionals seem to consider diasporic Muslims as largely unknowing about their health, bodies, and mind.[5] This is notably reflected in how they are seen to frame mental health problems as psychosomatic complaints.

> The intercultural counsellor is sometimes called in. But most often when we try to deal with people with a migration background... Why? Because . . . they often know little about their own body. We grow up with knowledge about our body, as a result of which we know how everything works . . . how many times do you learn about this, you learn about it in secondary education, you learn about it in elementary school . . . we really grow up with that. Over there, there are a lot of people who know little or almost nothing about the way their body functions, and as a result it might be supportive to explain a bit so they do not panic when something happens. We also notice that in healthcare in general, especially for people with children, when the children have a fever, we do not have a problem with that, . . . but the people here can sometimes totally panic because "once there was someone with a high fever and he died". People are completely panicking, they do not know . . . so you see that as a result of the lack of, or little knowledge of the way their own body functions etcetera, there is a lot of concern ... we sometimes have

5 Some of the respondents make a distinction between the older and the younger generations. The younger generations generally grew up in Belgium and incorporated the prevailing system of knowledge.

> the feeling that people get into a panic mode . . . because of things that are quite trivial to us. So we try to impart some knowledge, some knowledge about the body, also some knowledge about how our health system functions. We call that, without being condescending, our educational task (interview 8, coordinator, community health care centre).

In the scholarship on Western mental health care, a distinction is made between lay knowledge and expert knowledge: mental health service users are often ascribed experiential knowledge about their own body and experiences, but they are seen as lacking knowledge about disease processes or the process of diagnosis that only medically trained people have (Prior, 2003). In this excerpt we see how modern normalization processes are premised on, and further construct, a binary dialectic of Self and Other, as Said (2005) has analysed in detail. The Other is considered as different and inferior, whereby everything that diasporic Muslims with (mental) health problems say or do is considered as "non-sense" instead of meaningful. "Unknowing", moreover, seems to mean unknowing of Western medicine. This also implies a devaluing of the knowledge the Other might have—this is not the "right" kind of knowledge.

Research has also indicated that stereotype endorsement is stronger among those who grew up in (rural) towns or regions than those who grew up in (urban) cities. Their attitudes towards, for example, schizophrenia are also more negative and rejectionist. This is supposedly due to the fact that inhabitants of towns are more loyal to their culture, values, and the judgements of their communities (Gur & Kucuk, 2016; Sarıkoç & Öz, 2016). Another study shows that stigmatization most often takes the form of a paternalistic and benevolent view of the persons with mental health problems (Gur & Kucuk, 2016). In Ghent, Muslims came mostly from the Turkish rural town Emirdağ or from the urban Arabic regions in North-Morocco and the Berber regions of the Rif mountains (Fadil et al., 2015; Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht, & Van de Putte, 2012). It is known that individuals living in rural areas, or those with lower socio-economic status, are less likely to seek help (Gur & Kucuk, 2016). There is, moreover, a link between the level of education and stigmatization. How lower the education level and income, how higher the internalized stigmatization (Gur & Kucuk, 2016; Sarıkoç & Öz, 2016). The inverse relationship, however, has also been found: educated people or the higher economic classes have more negative attitudes toward persons with mental health problems (Gur & Kucuk, 2016).

The narratives of our respondents were profoundly shaped by orientalist tendencies. These have typically cast the scientific, modern West in opposition to a childish, magical, Oriental Other, in need of education (Said, 2005). Counsellors then see it as their task to educate clients, and turn them into autonomous citizens. Within a neoliberal view, clients without such knowledge are not considered as deserving, autonomous clients and are rejected (Wiebe, 2009). Yet the depth of the distinctions that the community health worker here

establishes cannot be understood without recognizing the operation of a logic of cultural difference that profoundly culturalizes both the distinction between knowing professional versus unknowing patient, as well as good (autonomous) client versus bad client.

Modern, Western knowledge, moreover, has special bearing in this context on the biomedical approach, which does not recognize its own "cultural" or situated dimensions but rather considers these as "universal" (Gailly, 1988). Some mental health professionals explicitly take this approach to Muslim clients, we found, while others do take cultural aspects into consideration and follow a more "culturally sensitive" approach (cf. infra). We found the latter to be rather widespread among the professionals we interviewed. And while in some respects this might be an improvement in relation to a logic that universalizes its own cultural bearings, very often culturally sensitive approaches continue to be marked by a logic of cultural difference which is premised on an "us"-"them" separation as well as the presentation of the Other as superstitious and unknowing. The latter characterization, moreover, amplifies the construction of a "bad" or problematic subject for Western (mental) health care within a neoliberal logic (Wiebe, 2009).

> I do not want to draw a caricature but, for example, last year we heard a couple of times about exorcism in the news. One also finds other solutions for a problem that one wants to solve in the community itself. These are of course really extreme examples, but they exist. And they will probably still be present. While we, Western health care practitioners, think about other solutions than devil exorcism. But, those are things that... I believe one looks for other kinds of solutions than you and I would look for if we would have problems. So yes, many problems (interview 3, coordinators, consultative body).

> There is also too little knowledge about the body. Too little knowledge about the notion of depression etcetera . . . Even in our society this is a taboo. Let alone in the Turkish, Moroccan community. It is also a taboo. You are rejected. No, that is too extreme. I am telling it in terms of prejudices . . . Because that is to fall short of God etcetera. Yes (interview 11, general practitioner, community health centre).

A Turkish general practitioner, however, when asked if he saw a difference in the way diasporic Muslims perceive mental health, responded:

> No, no. I think that has all changed. I would say that it is also seen as normal, mental health care. So the approach to mental health problems used to be more: "yes, is this one possessed?" or something similar. And they need to go to someone else than a doctor. But we see now that it becomes more and more accepted as an illness. And that they want to be treated.

> Sure, sure. It is an evolution, it is changing. So people see things, are reading, are following things and nowadays it is all with social media etcetera . . . (interview 20, general practitioner, private practice).

Or as another respondent, a psychologist in a private practice, said:

> I think that by bringing mental health care in the public sphere through the announcement of days such as "too insane" days and the day of mental health care and the way that centres of mental healthcare come out with their assistance nowadays. And that much more figures in the media, in different programmes—not only in *Libelle* [a lifestyle magazine]—, on different aspects of psychiatric problems. Nowadays, there is something on television about mental health care every day, and ten years ago that was not the case. But also the generations of Turkish people change-; in a sense, they become more and more integrated in our way of thinking about mental health care. And the current generations are informed of how it works. In the past—twenty, thirty years ago—that was not the case, because, the people were not in Belgium as long as is now the case and they had no need to or insight in how it all functions. I notice that is a big difference (interview 24, psychologist, private practice).

Here a psy-logic, and the biomedical model it rests on, take the upperhand. The problems are identified as illnesses in need of treatment by a doctor. This general practitioner is also aware that his patients become more and more educated. Lay knowledge is sometimes ambiguous about scientific biomedicine and can consist of intuitive, individuated, and personalized knowledge. Lay knowledge and expert knowledge need to be considered more and more as a continuum and not as polarized positions (McClean & Shaw, 2005).

A second finding is the important role our respondents attributed to the family and community of the subjects.

> The pressure of the family. And being confined to the family, also the taboo on asking for help . . . Not wanting that problems and stuff come out in the public sphere. And that they need to stay within the family, but that is a cultural fact. That has nothing to do with discrimination, exclusion, etcetera. Or... Yes, still also a cultural aspect. I do not want to hyperculturalize but... (interview 1, counsellor, community health centre).

These narratives almost tend to overrule the individuality of the subjects. Here we can identify the logic of cultural difference that juxtaposes so-called collectivistic cultures to so-called individualistic Western cultures. According to our respondents, collectivistic cultures are characterized by a strong tendency to gossip and the difficulty of keeping secrets. This is supposed to be more the case in the Turkish

community than in the Moroccan community, and older generations are supposed to have more problems with this than younger generations, who are already more individualistic.

> Community. For example, in the Turkish or Moroccan one probably, but especially in Turkish culture, there is an enormous culture of gossip, everything goes around very fast. And there is also a prejudice against people with psychiatric problems, so that is not OK. And I believe that also among Flemish people this is not always OK.... But you notice that there is still more pressure from the community. The belief that we can keep something a secret within our family. I believe that that is much more complicated within other cultural communities, there everything is passed on. And that is also often the fear when you work with interpreters, that they will not keep their mouths shut. And that is also very difficult, I know from the people who work here as cultural interlocutors, as interpreters, that they really are asked questions by their communities. I believe that those people sometimes get into very difficult situations (interview 5, counsellor, psychology service of social services).

> Those were people with an atypical country of origin, so they did not have a community that could see whether he or she had help, while being here in Ghent. For example, among the Turks . . . there are many differences. Islam will also play a role in it, because that is really their religion. Take care of your parents. We also have that, but maybe still a little less than it should be. Or I believe that the pressure is still a little different (interview 10, staff member, community organization).

Another purported characteristic of collectivistic cultures is the pressure to keep the care of family members in the community. Within a cultural logic, this characteristic is most often attributed to "a different culture". That for some minority populations community or family might at least appear to be safer than existing mental health care institutions—notably because of how racism characterizes and shapes existing institutions, including mental health institutions, in Belgian society—is not part of the equation. From a psy-logic, moreover, the tendency to seek help within the community is assumed to be an impediment to care.

It is also important to take the literature on stigma into account. The influence of the community might also be explained by a higher level of anticipated self-stigma. Research has shown that seeking help from general practitioners and psychiatrists, but not from psychologists, is more difficult when self-stigma is more pronounced (Pattyn, Verhaeghe, Sercu, & Bracke, 2014). It also seems to be the case that hospitalization is linked with higher self-stigma (Sarıkoç & Öz, 2016). On the other hand, the fear that the community would gossip can be associated with a higher level of perceived public stigma. In that case, one is afraid of devaluation and social

discrimination by one's social network (Ciftci, Jones, & Corrigan, 2013; Pattyn et al., 2014). This is also the reason why many persons with mental health problems are reluctant to seek treatment (Sarıkoç & Öz, 2016). One can also speak of label avoidance: "instances in which individuals choose to not seek help for mental health problems in order to avoid negative labels" (Ciftci et al., 2013) which could, for example, form an impediment for marriage candidates. So, the bonds with the immediate family improve, but the relation to society gets worse (Sarıkoç & Öz, 2016).

2. Epistemological Aspects

The epistemological aspect of subjectivity revolves around the question: "How can we know the subject?" The more culturally sensitive actors among our respondents emphasized that they wanted to really listen to the stories of people who seek their help, instead of relying on a more traditional consultation model. They offered critiques on organizations that approach mental health problems primarily in a biomedical way, and that prioritize the organizational structures over the well-being of their clients. We encountered mental health practitioners who criticized the neoliberal logic, and sought to work with people on a case-by-case base, instead of being driven by organizational values that value efficiency, time-concerns, and standardization over people.

> It is the organization, and the organization of the system, yes yes. They are creating such barriers for their organization that they say, already on the phone, "yes but they will not get there, they do not know the language well enough, that will not go smoothly. We will not take that one". Systematically, they do not look at the people, not at the needs, they look at the values and norms of their organization. And that is no longer human. And there we will need to change something. And we go back to policy (interview 9, staff members, city service).

In this particular instance a cultural logic, i.e. recognizing that people might not speak the prevalent language within the organization, served to reject neoliberal imperatives and resulted in a constructive and creative culturally sensitive approach. This logic, moreover, was infused by an awareness that prevailing procedures within current Western biomedicine do not suffice.

> So the art is to find entrances in which you, in a culturally sensitive way— to use the word— succeed in digging up the sensitivities and there where you suspect that people are stuck by problems they have to bring them to the surface. This will still require a lot of searching, but I believe that that is indeed the way we will need to go about it. That we can't just copy and paste from the white people so, we are doing that... It will require more skills (interview 2, co-workers, umbrella organization).

These practitioners prefer a way of working that reaches out to clients, uses interpreters, is life-world oriented, and allows for exceptions to the rules.

> We are actually quite used to rely on the consultation model . . . You have a problem, someone sits there, you go to that person, you have a consultation. But this is a quite Western model that we use. The way it happens in other cultures is not at all like that, this is very noticeable. Do not let your clients come to you at consultation, but the other way around. Go to their homes. Travel around yourself. Or go much closer, where the people dwell and live, and into the community (interview 2, co-workers, umbrella organization).

> I believe that you need to work with the time people have, and that means demand-oriented working. And that is what we at the service really try to do. We take liberties with the standard structures, standard rules. That is the general view in the service, through which we also reach those people. In a Community Mental Health centre, I believe, sometimes one attaches more importance to certain guidelines or certain structures, for example, clients need to be motivated, need to be at appointments. If we get a referral and the client is absolutely not motivated, then it is our job to get him motivated for therapy. If the client does not like the sound of coming to the centre, than we go on a house call. So disregarding the origin of the client or the problem, our goal is to take care of those people who otherwise do not get to the psychologist. And I believe that this also implies that we can reach those people with a migration background, because we use those methods in any case. We will not say, when someone with a Russian background does not show up, that we cannot give therapy. Then we are already happy with everything that we can offer at that moment that the client is with us (interview 5, counsellor, psychological service of the social services).

While the last quote represents an exception in this respect, we found a general tendency to hyper-culturalise, while the respondents precisely claimed not to do so. Instead of considering people in their particularity, which of course includes cultural aspects, many practitioners approached "culture" in a homogeneous sense, and operated under the assumption that others are almost completely determined by their culture, and that every individual is a representative of their culture, unmediated by personal or contextual elements. And while this cultural logic functions as a ground of critique in relation to the biomedical and neoliberal logic the practitioners felt pressured by, it did so through fostering a very essentialised view of "us" versus "them"—a view that aligned quite seamlessly with Said's understanding of Orientalism (Said, 2005).

3. Ethical Aspects

A third aspect of subjectivity that Rose highlights is the ethical aspect. Here ethics pertains to the kind of selves that are valued as "good subjects" and to which one should aspire. As already discussed at the outset of this article, Rose's work helps us to understand how neoliberal governmentality relies on the expectation of free, independent, autonomous civilians, and how the psy-disciplines have been instrumental in creating those free subjects that are necessary in a liberal democracy (Rose, 1998).

The most important values and traits of "good subjects" that we were able to identify in our interviews are: recovery, activation, responsibility, and independence. In the last decades, marked by the deinstitutionalization of residential services and the development of community-based services, "recovery" became popular in mental health care in Flanders (Vandekinderen et al., 2012). "Recovery" is defined as "enabling people with mental health problems to 'regain control over their lives, and . . . be responsible for their own individual journey of recovery' (Deegan in Vandekinderen et al., 2012, p. 2)".[6] Recovery was mentioned by our respondents as an important frame of reference, which they understood as clients taking responsibility for their own healing process and formulating their own goals while taking into account their vulnerability.

> But there is also some philosophy behind the concept of recovery: I am the expert of my life. I know what is best for me at this moment and also later I will know what is best. And you caregivers, you have studied for that, help me with that, the route that I am mapping out for myself, help me to walk that way (interview 2, co-workers, umbrella organization).

This approach to "recovery" is simultaneously marked by the psy-logic and the logic of neoliberalism. To be a good citizen means being a healthy autonomous individual. The figure of the autonomous individual emerges from both a neoliberal and a therapeutic discourse, as a consequence of the "responsibilisation" and the "autonomisation" of the self (Brunila, 2014).[7] The concept of recovery is thus also linked with the emergence of a set of new ideas about citizenship, based on the assumption that people with mental health problems have the right to live their life *in* society just as everybody else does (Vandekinderen et al., 2012). The value of activation and responsibility is stressed while the importance attached to the learning process included within counselling is also emphasized. It is through subjectification processes that occur within these conversations that one is supposed to learn how to behave at work and in society at large (Rose, 1999).

6 In the literature we can find two different approaches to recovery: an individual and a social one. Both are linked to different notions of citizenship. The individual notion of recovery is connected to a normative perspective on citizenship and the social notion of recovery is connected to a relational and inclusive notion of citizenship (Vandekinderen et al., 2012).

7 The therapeutic ethos is formed by the permeation of the language of disorder, addiction, vulnerability, and dysfunction together with associated practices from different branches of therapy in popular culture as well as in political systems (Brunila, 2014).

> Showing or not showing up is an item in counselling. Because it is also about the activation of people, about acquiring responsibility, about the development of an identity. I am someone, and I am someone who keeps his or her appointments, I am someone. That is something that we find very important, so not showing up or showing up is an item as such in counselling. You also have people who are always half an hour late. Good, I am glad you are here. In that case you do not speak about that half hour. Do you notice that it is because it does not bother them to be on time? Then you discuss that and you notice if there is a problem or not. If people had to summon up all their courage to get here, yeah, then they are half an hour late. But then you can say when they are a little bit earlier the next time "ah I see that you are a little bit earlier, that you managed." You work with that. So we do a lot to let the clients come to us, but we also expect that they take responsibility, there is a line, there is a difference between meeting people where they are and patronizing. Some responsibility remains with the client, and when you have a longer trajectory with people, then you work towards that. That is the ultimate goal, that they come to counselling, without you having to phone them, without missing an appointment, that they are on time, that they call when they are not able to come. That is a goal, because those attitudes are also needed in society, they also need them when they go to work, when they have to go to their children's schools. You just need them. I believe that sometimes this is also due to cultural stuff, keeping appointments (interview 5, counsellor, psychology service of social service).

For some of our interlocutors, the values of recovery, self-responsibility, and independence seem to be the most important objectives of the counselling process, almost more important than the client's mental health. These values are central in our contemporary neoliberal society. The dominant discourse implies that citizens have the responsibility, the social obligation, to realize those values (Rose, 1998; 1999; Vandekinderen et al., 2012).

4. Technical Aspects

Finally, Rose (1999) draws attention to the technical aspect of subjectivity, which revolves around the question: "What do subjects need to do to change or improve themselves?" In the answers to this question we can observe that, in line with a predominant neoliberal spirit, the responsibility for the recovery process is the client's.

> I work very systemically, circularly. And I very often get people who perceive their problem as linear. See, that is the cause, that need to get over it and be done with it, that need to be fixed. You have to do it for me.

> They see me as an expert, while I consider myself as someone next to the person who is the expert of his or her own life (interview 7, psychologist, community health centre).

According to our respondents, clients have to prove that they are good citizens by curing themselves, and when necessary they can appeal to the psy-disciplines for help. The underlying assumption seems to be that good and full citizens are autonomous, rational, healthy, and economically independent (Rose, 1998; 1999; Vandekinderen et al., 2012). Rose calls this pressure to "do it yourself" the "therapeutic imperative" (Rose, 1998; 1999). Nowadays, this therapeutic imperative combines a psy-logic and a neoliberal logic.

> Recovery refers to the idea that people with psychiatric problems have to formulate goals for themselves. I have, here and now, these kinds of problems. And these are the kinds of solutions, or those are the problems I want a solution for. And caregivers help me with solving it or guide me in the search for solutions for those kinds of problems (interview 2, co-workers, umbrella organization).

> That has to do with capacity and mental capacity. There are people whom it does not bother and there are people who simply drown. That does not make it okay that such things happen, but it is still the responsibility of the people with a migration background themselves with a certain issue to deal with it in a certain way. It is not because you are wronged that you have no responsibility. Your responsibility is to deal with it in a good way. And then I believe you can support people to make them more resilient. It does not make things right, but it is what it is in this context, people have to live in it. And then I believe it is the job of the caregivers to be aware of the fact that people live in it and to help them to find tools to deal with that (interview 5, counsellor, psychology service of social service).

Throughout this approach to recovery, there is a strong tendency to neglect social and cultural circumstances and structural inequalities that hinder people with mental health problems (Vandekinderen et al., 2012). In the case of diasporic Muslims with mental health problems, we can speak of a double stigma, which results from their ethnic-religious background as well as their problems. Here it is important to take an intersectional approach that takes the entanglement of power relations and identities into account. The stigma will not only differ in degree but also in quality with different effects on the individual. So there is a strong sense of shame among families with a Turkish background. This shame can be so strong that the persons with mental health problems remain in the house and avoid the public sphere. Often fathers would blame mothers for giving birth to such a child. Even when diasporic Muslims hold positive opinions towards mental healing, social stig-

ma is strong, because of the concern for the family's social standing. The disclosure of mental health problems is still considered shameful (Ciftci et al., 2013).

People with no severe mental health problems typically distance themselves more from their diagnosis than people with a more severe diagnosis. One can explain this by the fact that their symptoms do not look like the social stereotypes of mental health problems. Also people with no previous history of treatment are more likely to distance themselves from their diagnosis because they often believe that their problems are limited in time, recoverable, and manageable with medication or therapy. Stigma also influences the way people will deflect their identity as a person with mental health problems. The greater the perceived stigma, the greater the chance people will reject the characteristics linked to mental health problems. Finally, the number of conventional role identities one holds, influences the likelihood of deflecting an identity as a person with mental health problems: the more conventional role identities one holds, the less important the identity as a person with mental health problems is (Thoits, 2016).

Conclusion

In an attempt to gain insight into the dynamics at stake in the underrepresentation of diasporic Muslims in mental health care services in Ghent, we explored and analysed the perspectives of mental health care practitioners. We asked: "How do mental health care workers in Ghent, a middle-sized city in Belgium, approach and construct diasporic Muslims, as subjects and service users of mental health care?" We relied upon the work of Nikolas Rose (1998; 1999) to do so and turned more specifically to his method of studying subjectivity in relation to therapeutic practices and logics.

This analysis challenged us not only to illustrate and discuss different aspects of the subjectivity dimension, as laid out by Rose, but also to enlarge our analytical approach. First, our data required more attention to the neoliberal context. At the heart of the neoliberal approach to a psy-logic lies the responsibility to be a free and healthy subject, with a self that objectifies itself and constructs a hermeneutic of the self, whereby one learns to interpret oneself and to construct a narrative about the real self in psychological and medical terms (Rose, 1999). Rose's work has drawn attention to the political economy of neoliberalism that began its rise to hegemony in the 1980s and involves the application of liberal market principles to other, non-economic spheres of life (Rose, 1998; 1999). Yet the ways in which neoliberalism has prompted new modes of subjectification, revolving around the individual, its interests, freedom, and regulation of the self, have been particularly intense, and require more (specific) analytical attention.

Second, we discerned another potent logic running through the narratives of our respondents, which proved to be a crucial one in accounting for the views the mental health care workers we spoke to held about diasporic Muslims, i.e. a logic of

"cultural difference".[8] In order to further operationalize the logic of cultural difference, we turn to Edward Said's seminal work *Orientalism* (2005 [1978]). Relying on a Foucaultian understanding of discourse, Said (2005) defines Orientalism as a historical and systematic discipline by which Europe produced the Orient, thus unpacking the intricacies of power/knowledge through laying bare the intimate relationships between colonialism and the scholarly study of the Orient. At the heart of Orientalism as a style of thought, Said argues, lies the production of an ontological and epistemological distinction between the Orient and the West, a distinction that is essentialised. More recently, and notably in the context of the post-1989 reshuffling of the geopolitical landscape, the notion of the Orient has increasingly come to coincide with Islam resulting in the well-known oppositional framing of the West and Islam in which superior values are attributed to the West and inferior ones to Islam. The epistemological structures of Orientalism obscure the profoundly dialectical ways in which identities of, and knowledges about, Self and Other are constructed (Rondelez et al., 2016).

However, as we are teasing out the relevance of the work of Rose (1998; 1999) and Said (2005) to make sense of our empirical data, we also come to the conclusion that their work not only allows us to *select* and gain insights, but also to *deflect* crucial insights concerning underlying rationales and views of professionals in mental health care services. Their theoretical contributions enable us to challenge binary and categorical thinking, which is reflected in oppositional dichotomies between the Self and Other that often function as underlying and implicit assumptions in the field of mental health care. Their views enabled us to analyse how Muslims with a migration background are perceived as unknowing subjects, and how mental health professionals exercise authority over and use their expert knowledge on these subjects (Prior, 2003), developing an idea that the "culture" of Muslims with a migration background is homogeneous although they claim that they use a culturally sensitive approach. The work of Rose and Said, nonetheless, also created blind spots in our analytical grid, and only allowed for a critical deconstruction of this binary dialectic between ontologically different categories of Self and Other (see Foucault, 1978; Butler, 2004). The analytical grid did not enable us to go beyond a negative appreciation of professionals in mental health care and to imagine a non-deterministic and non-dualistic framing of the human subject formation of diasporic Muslims with whom they try to work (see Braidotti, 2013; Vandekinderen & Roets, 2016). Our analysis mainly uncovers individual approaches to recovery but does not illuminate a truly social approach to recovery, in which people with mental health issues and professionals have an alliance and share responsibility in shaping care and support practices in a continuous dialogue (Beresford & Croft, 2004; Vandekinderen et al., 2012). This will be of vital importance in future research.

8 We are not referring to the whole debate about norms and values in the sector of mental health. We only refer to ethnic culture here, but are aware that there are also other norms.

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5

What Are You Reading?

Abstract
The "What are your reading?" section invites (early-career) researchers to report on works that are deemed relevant to the field and that are of particular significance to the author's ongoing research. This "What are your reading?" contains discussions of Daisy Hernandez and Bushra Rehman's *Colonize this! Young Women of Color on Today's Feminism*; Chi Mgbako's *To Live Freely in this World: Sex Worker Activism in Africa*; Sara Ahmed's *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*; Nira Yuval-Davis's *Gender & Nation*; Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*; Samuel Moyn's lecture "How Human Rights Changed Utopianism" and book *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*.

Keywords
feminism, intersectionality, sex work, postcolonialism, Frantz Fanon, human rights

Hernandez D. & B. Rehman (Eds.) (2002), *Colonize this! Young Women of Color on Today's Feminism*. New York: Seal Press.

Stories and personal narratives are important; they testify to lived experiences, to the ways in which relations of domination are concretely lived and resisted, and have, therefore, been used in feminist criticism and critical pedagogy as important tools for social change. As Sherene Razack writes: "Storytelling refers to an opposition to established knowledge, to Foucault's suppressed knowledge, to the experience of the world that is not admitted into dominant knowledge paradigms".[1] The not so new but still highly relevant edited volume *Colonize this!* is a collection of very personal stories of young feminist women of colour who position themselves within and against mainstream feminist discourses. The book presents itself as a new form of activism and community building, uniting women

1 Razack, S. (1998). *Looking White People in the Eye. Gender, Race and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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with "a shared history of oppression and resistance", and as a continuation of similar pioneer editions like Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua's *This Bridge Called My Back*.[2]

The editors want to present voices and perspectives that all too often (still) remain unheard, unseen, and marginalized. These are the voices of "immigrant, native-born and survivor-of-slavery daughters", the female children of the refugees and migrating single mothers who had to fight against racism, sexism, and daily humiliations. Most of the contributors have become acquainted with academic feminism through university courses or writing classes. All testify to the ambiguous feelings these invoked in them: the joy of finding a language and the theoretical tools to name and understand women's oppression, but also the anger and disappointment when faced with white feminists' misunderstanding and sometimes even hostility towards black, native, and immigrant women's experiences. The writers try to fill in the gaps by highlighting a feminism that lies "where other people don't expect it to". For example, in the lives of their mothers, aunts, and grandmothers, all too often characterized as passive and oppressed. While these women "would never call themselves feminists", their "everyday feminism" is proudly acknowledged: not their words or theories, but their practices, perseverance, and resilience in hostile environments presented their daughters with role models and inspiration for their own activism and more theoretically informed feminism.

The stories and topics treated are diverse, ranging from accounts dealing with racism, sexism, and violence within one's own family and community, over queerness and surviving in heteronormative environments, to challenging "gentrification" (read: "whites moving in, blacks getting out"), beauty myths, and street harassment. I would highly recommend this book to anyone calling themselves feminist: as a reminder of how we can learn from each other and from "difference", and as an inspiration for feminist practices that do not deny the divides but that keep on recognizing "difference" and trying to find ways to build bridges.

Sophie Withaeckx

Mgbako, C. (2016) *To Live Freely in this World: Sex Worker Activism in Africa*. New York: New York University Press.

I read Chi Mgbako's *To Live Freely in this World: Sex Worker Activism in Africa* as part of the literature that guided my Master's dissertation which asked, "What does it mean to be an African sex worker feminist?". Given that most strands of African feminisms tend to be grounded in some form of activism, I figured that the book could give me insights into how feminism and activism intersect and come to be embodied within the African sex worker feminist. Chapter Five "Solidarity Is Beautiful: Intersectionality of Sex Worker, Feminist, HIV, LGBT, and Social Justice Organizing" was especially interesting and useful to draw from.

2 Moraga, C. & Alazaldua, G. (1981). *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. London: Persephone Press.

One of the elements that this chapter explores is the extent to which intersectional activism by feminist organisers supported the birth of sex worker movements in certain African countries. For instance, Mgbako cites activism by Ugandan feminists such as legal scholar Sylvia Tamale and gender activist Solome Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe, who have long been strong allies of the sex worker movement in that country. As a fellow African feminist scholar and sex workers' rights advocate, I was curious to learn how these feminists/activists (Mgbako included) navigate the tensions within feminist scholarship on sex work.

Feminist discourses on sex work are largely divided into two opposing schools of thought; the "sex work model" which recognises selling sex as a legitimate form of work (Nagel, 1997; Jeffreys, 2011), and the "sexual exploitation approach" that sees all forms of sex work as intrinsically exploitative (especially to women) and, therefore, a manifestation of patriarchy (Dworkin, 1993; MacKinnon, 2011).[3] However, these dichotomous strands in feminist literature on sex work tend to exclude the voices of African sex workers who also self-identify as feminists. Mgbako's book gave me the conceptual lens and theoretical tools with which to emphatically argue for the inclusion of African sex worker feminists' voices within these discourses; allowing me to make sense of the participants' own understandings of feminism in relation to sex work. As one of the respondents proclaimed:

> For me I'd say *feminism is sex work.* [...] if a person knows who a sex worker is. A sex worker is [the] best definition of feminism, because... like [fellow participant's name] was saying, our society tells you what a woman should do, what a woman should wear. You're supposed to get married and have one husband, you know, have children. A sex worker is the opposite of that. We fit in the society by force (focus group, 17 June 2015).

So instead of regarding sex work as the ultimate symbol of patriarchy, Mgbako encourages one to also recognise the bodily integrity and sexual autonomy expressed by respondents such as in the example above, and therefore the potential sex work has in challenging patriarchal social norms.

To Live Freely in this World got me thinking about how African sex worker rights' activists can help develop feminist politics in our continent. Perhaps an injection of this radical "force" the above respondent is alluding to is what sex worker rights' activism brings to the evolution of African feminisms. A transformation that inspires the conceptualisation of a strand of African feminism that speaks most honestly to the nuances and complexities of selling sex in Africa.

Ntokozo Yingwana

3 Nagle, J. (Ed) (1997). *Whores and Other Feminists*. Routledge; Jeffreys, E. (10 June 2011). Why feminists should listen to sex workers, *The Scavenger*. Retrieved from http://www.thescavenger.net/feminism-a-pop-culture-sp-9560/feminism-a-pop-culture/732-why-feminists-should-listen-to-sex-workers.html; Dworkin, A. (1993). Prostitution and male supremacy, *Michigan Journal of Gender, 1*(1), 1-12; and MacKinnon, C. (2011). Trafficking, prostitution, and inequality, *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review*, *46*(2), 271-309.

Ahmed, S. (2000). *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*. London: Routledge.

In *Strange Encounters* Sara Ahmed combines postcolonial and feminist theory in a way that has helped to determine the direction of my own research within the field of Scandinavian literature. Using phenomenology as a starting point, Ahmed offers a new approach to examine how the figure of the stranger is positioned within an encounter between individuals as well as in a broader cultural context. By looking at the processes of determining the stranger in encounters, Ahmed presents a rejection of what she calls stranger fetishism, which "invests the figure of a stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts 'the stranger' off from the histories of its determination" (5). Instead, she highlights the importance of the specific elements that determine individual strangerness. Moreover, she shows how elements that establish difference are often actually claimed by Western society to exoticise and fetishise strangerness.

I chose Ahmed's work as a theoretical foundation for my research because it approaches cultural diversity and hybridity in a way that does not assume a concept of culture with clear demarcations. This opens up the possibility of looking beyond clearly defined cultural communities and moves away from binary oppositions such as minority/majority culture. My research aims to analyse novels that are published in the field of Scandinavian literature, and that present narrations of a specific area where minority and majority cultures meet. All the novels in my corpus describe processes of identification in a setting where the boundaries between minority and majority become blurred and cultural identity is marked by a profound hybridity. Ahmed's work has allowed me to develop a more nuanced perspective on the negotiation of cultural difference. She highlights the importance of understanding "how identity is established through strange encounters without producing a universe of strangers" to comprehend "the relationship between identity and strangerness in lived embodiment" (6). In addition, her work has taught me to avoid stranger fetishism. The notion of the encounter allows me to analyse the lived or individual experiences of cultural identity. It highlights cultural hybridity, and emphasizes how the individual experiences this hybridity.

Strange Encounters has not only offered me an approach I could adopt in my research but it has also made me aware of my blind spots. Ahmed's work has contributed to my understanding of contemporary feminism and the complicated transnationality and diversity that goes beyond Western feminism, prompting a more ethical and inclusive approach. Furthermore, *Strange Encounters*, but also Ahmed's work in general, can be useful when looking at cultural areas that transcend national approaches such as Scandinavian Studies. Often these disciplines rely on the concept of national identities or apply a generalising or homogenising approach. Ahmed's work can help to redirect the focus to cultural hybridity and to shed light on how processes of identification work in specific cultural contexts.

Rozemarijn Vervoort

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender & Nation*. London: Sage Publications.

In her book *Gender & Nation* Nira Yuval-Davis's aim is to introduce a framework to analyse how discourses of gender and nationalism intersect in a multitude of ways. She does so by critically deconstructing gender-blind theorizations of nationalism (e.g. John Hutchinson and Antony D. Smith's 1994 Oxford reader on *Nationalism*, where the topic of gender relations is only mentioned in the final section). Her first chapter "Women and the Biological Reproduction of the Nation" focuses on the ways in which women are regarded as the biological reproducers of the nation. The second chapter "Cultural Reproduction and Gender Relations" discusses constructions of woman- and manhood as symbolic border guards of the imagined community. Chapter Three examines citizenship and difference. Chapter Four analyses gender relations in war and the military. Chapter Five explores transversal politics as a model for women's co-operation.

It is especially the second chapter "Cultural Reproduction and Gender Relations" that is of interest to my research on right-wing Hindu nationalist women's movements in India. Yuval-Davis's analysis of women as cultural reproducers of the imagined collective improved my understanding of symbolic figures such as "Mother India" and of the emergence of militant training camps for girls. Her book not only provided a critical framework for my research but also made me want to know more about the subject. I was particularly struck by the paradoxical relationship between fundamentalist movements and women's empowerment and started to read more about the (limited) potential for empowerment that women sometimes craft for themselves in certain right-wing movements, such as the *Rashtra Sevika Samiti* (a Hindu nationalist women's organisation similar to the *Rashtra Swayamsevak Sangh* for men) or the *Durga Vahini* (the women's wing of the *Vishva Hindu Parishad*, known for its organisation of militant training camps for girls).

Published in 1997, *Gender & Nation* provides a critical review of existing literature on nationalism as a concept and questions the absence of a gender perspective in mainstream research on nationalism. Since its first appearance, it has become a classic in many undergraduate and graduate courses on gender and nationalism. Nevertheless, critics have pointed out that while Yuval-Davis succeeds in providing an extensive and critical overview of research on gender and nationalism, she does not put forward a superior contribution of her own.[4] This is often seen in contrast with her earlier work *Woman-Nation-State*, which she co-edited with Floya Anthias and Jo Campling, and which introduces a theoretical model newly developed by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, providing a framework for case studies from a wide variety of countries concentrating on the link between gender, nationalism, and the state. In addition, Yuval-Davis has stated that in her recent work, she talks more about "intersectionality" and the "politics of belonging" than "gender" and "nation", illustrating a shift from a focus on gender towards an intersectional and multi-layered perspec-

4 Davis, U. (2002). [Review of the book *Gender & Nation*, by N. Yuval-Davis] *Third World Quarterly, 23*(4), 776-778.

tive. Nevertheless, as a graduate student, I found *Gender & Nation* to be a useful introduction to the study of gender, diversity, and nationalism. The work serves as a reminder of the importance of gender in research on nation formation and the politics of belonging.

Laura Andriessen

Fanon, F. (1952). *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press.

Although one may think Fanon's work outdated, I found his discussion of intimate black-white relationships in *Black Skin, White Masks* extremely helpful for my understanding of such present-day relationships. I had heard about Fanon before but never read his work. My friend and classmate—we are both MA students in Gender and Diversity Studies—referred to Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, when she shared her struggle to find a balance between acknowledging her privileges as a white woman and engaging in an intimate relationship with a black man who is living in the global south. Her struggle inspired me to read Fanon and to build on his work for my MA thesis on black-white couples.

Fanon's socio-psychological account of racism, which he developed from his own experiences of a lifetime amongst the black middle-class in France and the French Caribbean, helped me to think through the ways in which colonialism has affected our understanding of "whiteness" as a set of ideas in contrast to "blackness" as, supposedly, a lack of these ideas. Fanon argues that the black men and women in his study internalize racism towards themselves and the black "race" in general. Moreover, they adopt the idea of white supremacy, i.e. the idea that "white" is superior to "black". In my research I aim to explore to what extent internalized racism or black inferiority and white supremacy are alive and reproduced in the intimate sphere. I argue that although we have adopted a discourse of "mixing" and diversification, we still (re)produce the power mechanisms addressed by Fanon in his work.

Fanon's work has helped me to recognize traces of our colonial past in spheres that had hitherto seemed to be saved by the grace of "love". By analysing the narratives of twenty-three Dutch and Belgian black and white interviewees who engage in intimate black-white relationships, I learned that Fanon's thesis is still applicable to our own time and place. Feelings of white superiority and black inferiority are very much alive, even if they are hidden under layers of anti-racist, postcolonial discourse. Both "black" and "white" partners in my research seemed to be unaware of internalized racist ideas, in spite of their racial literacy. Sixty-five years after its publication, Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* still helps us to critically review the power mechanisms that cause the internalization of white superiority and black inferiority, not only in the public sphere but also in the intimate lives of couples.

Emma-Lee Amponsah

Moyn, S. (2016). "How Human Rights Changed Utopianism." Politeia Conference. Universiteitshal, Leuven. 11 April 2016.

Moyn, S. (2010). *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP.

In recent years, the legal historian Samuel Moyn has sought to question and disrupt the central narrative that has developed in the multi- and interdisciplinary field of human rights. His landmark book *The Last Utopia* provides a destabilizing counter-narrative to more linear histories and harmonious conceptions of human rights (e.g. Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights*, 2007; Peter de Bolla, *The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human Rights*, 2013). Moyn suggests that human rights emerged as a specific response to the failed political utopias of the twentieth century, thus moving away from traditional histories that trace the concept back to eighteenth-century French and American declarations of rights. His central argument exposes the remarkably contingent rise of human rights and deconstructs the incongruous mixture of ideas and events of the past few decades that led it to become the present day's foremost global moral and legal discourse.

Moyn's keynote lecture at the 2016 Politeia Conference in Leuven, entitled "How Human Rights Changed Utopianism", sought to build on this earlier work by assessing the aspirations of the world's latest—or last—Utopia. The question is now not so much how we ended up with human rights as a dominant legal and moral discourse, but what the discourse of human rights stands for in relation to past utopias. This research question was prompted by the realization that the discursive rise of human rights, the salience of which can be tracked using Google Ngram Viewer, precisely matches the contemporary rise of neoliberal capitalism. This seems paradoxical, Moyn noted in his lecture, because the former is expressly concerned with promoting global equality, whereas the latter coalesces with a growth in inequality. Rather than accuse human rights of masking the worst effects of twenty-first century capitalism, however, Moyn argues that the utopia of human rights has instead fundamentally redefined the nature of equality itself to the extent that it is no longer mutually exclusive with the tenets of neoliberalism. Whereas contemporary capitalism has lifted the ceiling on the amount of wealth that can be accumulated by a single person or corporation, human rights criticism focuses on imposing a raised floor of minimum standards that is to be afforded to every human being. As such, Moyn suggests that the discourse of equality as it is taken up by human rights activists and organisations has shifted away from combatting inequality towards a new benchmark of "sufficiency".

Although Moyn did not venture to suggest what these poignant observations might mean for human rights' utopian aspirations or for the world's adoption of human rights discourse as its primary moral and political discourse in his lectures, the observations alone are thought-provoking. They provide valuable new cues for qualitative research in the field of gender and diversity studies concerned with issues of (in)equality. Moyn's lecture, for instance, prompts us to reconsider the oft taken for granted term of "equality", to define more explicitly what forms a more

egalitarian societal narrative would take, and to question the kinds of equality being pursued under the banner of human rights.

The individualism that defines human rights as a discourse—the Universal Declaration is essentially a list of individual rights—provides an intriguing point of departure in this respect. It is the driving force behind the popularity of the testimonial narrative form—often testimonies of underprivileged non-Western victims—among a rights-bearing Western audience. These narratives, in which individuals claim rights performatively by testifying to how their rights were abused, throws the discrepancy between equality and sufficiency into sharp relief. For instance, if stories can voice the subaltern's suffering in an engaging and poignant way, it is less clear whether or in what way the recognition of someone's rights (which might be considered "sufficient") leads to the granting of those rights (which would be closer to "equality"). The nature of the cross-cultural engagement between privileged readers and disempowered victims, as it is set up by the form and framing of the testimonial narrative, is crucial here since it asks how and to what extent rights can be claimed by disempowered subjects through the publication of testimonial narratives.

My own project, which deals with the work of the American author Dave Eggers, provides a useful case in point in the form of *What Is the What*, a collaborative testimonial project between Eggers and Valentino Achak Deng, a survivor of the Second Sudanese Civil War. In a broad sense, this project is typical of how human rights discourse operates in the cultural field. Its compelling narrativization of distant atrocities, facilitated by Eggers's aptitude for storytelling, asks readers to empathize with Deng's traumatic experiences, to recognize his right to be free from such treatment, and, by purchasing the book, to contribute to a charitable project in South Sudan. But which, if any, rights are at stake in *What Is the What*? Does it make a positive case for equal treatment or would the mere freedom from the brutality of such a Civil War suffice? On the basis of these specific questions, it is possible to rephrase and refine questions on a more abstract level of what the narrative of "sufficiency" in human rights means for our understanding of "equality". Is humanizing the victim—putting a face on suffering—through, for instance, a testimonial narrative the same as recognizing their full humanity? And is the affective, imaginative encounter that takes place in fiction, in turn, to be equated with recognizing a disempowered subject's right to rights? Or does the commitment to helping victims tell their stories constitute a new standard, in which the recognition of rights has come to replace rather than supplement the global struggle for equal rights?

Sean Bex

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